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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
charge of criminal mischief under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c)? 
Standard of Review: "The grant or denial fof a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law [that] we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial 
court.,n Salt Lake City v. Peterson, 2010 UT 64, f 6,k 245 P.2d 197 (citing State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 17, 70 P.3d 111). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the defendant's motion to dismiss 
raised at the end of the plaintiffs case. See Record ("R") at 112, p. 384, line 8 - p. 388, 
line 8. 
2. Was there sufficient evidence presented in the trial court to support the 
jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge of criminal mischief under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c)? 
Standard of Review: 
When reviewing a challenge for sufficiency of the evidence, 
we are 'highly deferential to a jury verdict,. . . and we will 
reverse only when 'reasonable minds could not have reached 
the verdict. Thus, we will reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
1 
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must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Cly, 2007 UT App 212, f 15 (citations omitted). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the motion of defense counsel to 
dismiss the charge made at the close of the plaintiffs case in chief. See R. at 112, p. 379, 
line4-line 10. 
3. Did the trial court err in not declaring a mistrial after the defendant, at a 
recess in the proceedings, was seen by a juror while the defendant was in handcuffs and 
being escorted by a bailiff? 
Standard of Review: 
A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a 
mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an 
abuse of that discretion. A defendant has the burden of 
persuading this court that the conduct complained of 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial. In other words, unless a 
review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly 
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the 
defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not 
find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 20, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citations omitted). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
See R at 112, p. 271, line 12 - line 21. 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the defendant to use evidence of 
past criminal convictions, currently pending criminal charges, and an existing ex parte 
civil stalking injunction against one of the alleged victims in order to impeach the 
2 
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testimony of such alleged victim or to establish the existence of threatening behavior by 
the alleged victim against the defendant and Ms. Quintero to prove that the alleged victim 
had a motive for threatening the defendant, thereby supplying a basis for the defendant's 
assertion of self defense? 
Standard of Review: "Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.55 State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, J 11, 32 P.3d 976, 980. 
"However, 'admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by 
trial judges in the proper exercise of that discretion. '"Id. (citations omitted). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. at 112, p. 191, line 13 - p. 213, line 
5. 
5. Did the trial court err in overruling the objection of the defendant to Jury 
Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, and in giving such jury instructions to the jury? 
Standard of Review: "The standard of review for jury instructions to which 
counsel has objected is correctness.55 State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (UT App 1998). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by defense counsel's objection to the 
instruction. See R. at 112, p. 355, line 8 - p. 363, line 19. 
6. Was the defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel based upon his 
attorneys5 failure to: 
a. Interview or subpoena witnesses identified by the defendant; and 
3 
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b. Acquire copies of certain tape recordings of conversations between 
the defendant and the alleged victim. 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 
162. 
This issue was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time with this 
appeal. 
7. Did the prosecution withhold certain tape recordings of conversations 
between the defendant and the alleged victim which would have been exculpatory of or 
beneficial to the defendant's defense, and thereby violate Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and defendant's due process rights? 
Standard of Review: "But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have 
violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient 
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." United States v. 
Agurs, All U.S. 97, 108 (1976). 
It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional 
error has been committed. This means that the omission must 
be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no 
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional 
evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. 
On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable 
I 
4 
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validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance 
might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
M a t 112-113. 
The question as to what duty a prosecutor has to disclose 
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case depends on 
the nature of the evidence, whether the defense made a 
specific request for the evidence, whether the evidence is 
perjured, whether the defense knew, or, using reasonable 
diligence, should have known, about the evidence, and, to a 
certain extent, the conduct of the prosecution. 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P. 2d 218, 223 - 224 (Utah 1980). 
This issue was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time with this 
appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103: Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses 
(A) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or 
(B) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-105: Transferred intent. 
Where intentionally causing a result is an element of an offense, that element is 
established even if a different person than the intended was killed, injured, or 
harmed, or different property than the actor intended was damaged or otherwise 
affected. 
5 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2)(ct): Criminal mischief. 
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under the circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property 
with the intention or defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of anoth and as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of 
any critical infrastructures; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
(d) recklessly or wilfully shoots or propels a missile or another object at or against 
a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, 
whether moving or standing. 
Rule 16(a)(l-4) & (b)of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of which e has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorder statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offence for 
reduced punishment; and.... 
(b) The prosecutor shall make disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filling of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor 
has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissable. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, accept as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States of the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by other rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. 
6 
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Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds 
of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations or undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim 
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in 
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if 
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Rule 607 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party 
calling the witness. 
7 
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Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Evidence of character and conduct of 
witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form 
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer 
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has 
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness 
for the purposes of attacking or supporting the witness5 character fro truthfulness, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or 
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness 
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.... 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: Impeachment by evidence of commitment of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall 
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a 
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the 
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, 
that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of 
a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless 
the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest 
the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that 
person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow 
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if 
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult 
and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render 
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is 
admissible. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves the appeal of certain rulings of the Fifth District Court, the 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham, and a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of 
aggravated assault, criminal mischief and reckless driving, and questioning whether 
defendant was provided with effective assistance of counsel. 
9 
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II. Course of Proceedings. 
By the filing of an Information on March 31, 2009, the defendant was initially 
charged with one count of aggravated assault, a 3rd degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-103; one count of criminal mischief, a 3rd degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c); one count of reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-528; and one count of leaving the scene of an accident, a 
class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-401. A preliminary hearing was 
scheduled for June 29, 2009. On that date an Amended Information was filed which 
retained the original charges and charged the defendant with an additional count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. After the preliminary hearing, the defendant 
was bound over and an arraignment was scheduled for July 2, 2009. At arraignment, the 
defendant pled not guilty to all charges. A three day jury trial was scheduled to begin on 
November 16, 2009. The jury trial was held as scheduled. The notice of appeal was filed 
on December 22, 2009. 
III. Disposition at the Trial Court. 
During trial, the defendant moved for a mistrial based upon the fact that the 
defendant was seen in the hallway at the courthouse by a juror while the defendant was in 
handcuffs. The trial court denied that motion. At the end of the plaintiffs case in chief, 
the defendant moved to dismiss all charges as the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie 
case. The trial court dismissed the charge of leaving the scene of an accident but allowed 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the remaining charges to go to the jury. The defendant objected to Jury Instruction Nos. 
11 and 12 based upon such instructions containing the wrong mental state required for 
finding the defendant guilty. However, the trial court overruled the defendant's 
objection. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on one count of aggravated assault, the 
count of criminal mischief, and the count of reckless driving. The defendant was found 
not guilty of the remaining charge of aggravated assault. 
On December 21, 2009, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison for the conviction of aggravated assault; 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison for the 
conviction of criminal mischief; and a term of six months in the Washington County jail. 
The defendant was given credit for time served. The prison term for aggravated assault 
was ordered to run consecutive to the other terms of incarceration. The defendant was 
also ordered to pay restitution. 
IV. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
On March 30, 2009, the Washington City police department received a call 
regarding a citizen dispute at a gas station in Washington City. (R. 112, p. 29o, line 20 -
p. 291, line 5). Shortly thereafter another call was received by the police department 
regarding a traffic offense at the same location. (R. 112, p. 291, lines 8-11.) Officer 
Christopher Ray, while responding to the first call, was advised to meet Anjelica Quintero 
at her home. (R. 112, p. 292, line 24 - p. 293, line 2). Ms. Quintero was the defendant's 
11 
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girlfriend at the time. (R. 112, p. 339, lines 17 - 20). When Officer Ray met with the 
defendant and Ms. Quintero, he was advised that the defendant and Ms. Quintero were 
driving home and saw Michael Stevens' vehicle at the gas station. They became 
concerned for their safety because Mr. Stevens had been recently threatening them. The 
defendant and Ms. Quintero did not want Mr. Stevens to know where they lived. (R. 112, 
p. 294, lines 2-18). 
As the defendant and Ms. Quintero returned to their apartment complex, they 
noticed Mr. Stevens parked on the corner by the complex. (R. 112, p. 295, lines 3-12). 
Since the defendant and Ms. Quintero did not wish to have Mr. Stevens know where they 
lived, they did not pull into their apartment complex. (R. 112, p. 295, lines 15-22). 
According to the defendant's and Ms. Quintero's initial statements, they drove past Mr. 
Stevens and continued back towards the gas station. After they passed Mr. Stevens, he 
began to chase them in his vehicle. They entered the gas station and Mr. Stevens 
continued to chase them around the pumps and to the backside of the building. (R. 112, 
p. 295, line 19 - p. 296, line 14). Mr. Stevens then pulled his vehicle in front of the 
defendant's and Ms. Quintero's vehicle, got out of the vehicle and approached the 
defendant and Ms. Quintero in a very aggressive manner. The defendant and Ms. 
Quintero could clearly see a black semi-automatic handgun in the front waistband of Mr. 
Stevens' pants. (R. 112, p. 297, lines 1-14). After receiving this information from the 
defendant and Ms. Quintero, Officer Ray went to the gas station to talk to Mr. Stevens, 
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who had been found there by another Washington City officer. (R. 112, p. 298, lines 17-
23). 
After arriving at the gas station, Officer Ray was able to view certain video 
recordings from security cameras on the premises. The video showed that Mr. Stevens5 
vehicle was actually being pursued by the vehicle driven by the defendant when it entered 
the gas station. (R. 112, p. 301, lines 8-19). Both the defendant's and Mr. Stevens' 
vehicles entered the gas station property and drove behind the building. The portion of 
the gas station property behind the building could not be seen on the video recordings. 
(R. 112, p. 306, lines 8-18). After approximately one and one-half minutes, the vehicle 
operated by the defendant drove from the back of the gas station building and exited onto 
the street. (R. 112, p. 308, lines 7-13). 
Mr. Stevens' story as told to Officer Ray differed from that of the defendant and 
Ms. Quintero. Mr. Stevens stated that he was sitting in his vehicle at the corner by the 
defendant's and Ms. Quintero's apartment, that he had dropped his cell phone and when 
he looked up, he saw Ms. Quintero and the defendant driving towards him. When Mr. 
Stevens began to drive away, he noticed that the defendant and Ms. Quintero began to 
follow him. He noticed that the defendant tried to pass his vehicle so Mr. Stevens sped 
up. However, the defendant was still able to pass Mr. Stevens' vehicle and once the 
defendant was in front of Mr. Stevens' vehicle, the defendant slammed on his brakes and 
forced Mr. Stevens to stop. Once the vehicles were stopped, the defendant put his vehicle 
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in reverse and tried to back up and hit Mr. Stevens5 vehicle. Mr. Stevens was able to 
avoid being hit and drove to the gas station, with the defendant and Ms. Quintero 
continuing to follow him. (R. 112, p. 309, line 13 - p. 310, line 16). 
According to Mr. Stevens5 testimony, after the two vehicles went to the rear of the 
gas station building, Mr. Stevens got out of his vehicle, put his hands up as if to ask 
"What's going on?55 (R. 112, p. 183, lines 11-13). The defendant's vehicle came to a 
stop approximately ten to fifteen away from Mr. Stevens, who was standing by a vehicle 
hoist. The defendant then drove towards Mr. Stevens and collided with the hoist. (R. 
112, p. 184, lines 2-24). The defendant then backed up his vehicle and proceeded to drive 
down the street. (R. 112, p. 185, lines 17-20). Shortly thereafter, the defendant returned 
to the gas station (R. 112, p. 238, lines 2-24) and, upon entering the gas station property, 
drove his vehicle towards Mr. Stevens. Mr. Stevens was struck by the defendant's 
vehicle. (R. 112, p. 242, lines 6-12). 
The defendant claimed that his actions with regard to Mr. Stevens were based upon 
the defendant's fear for his life due to previous threats by Mr. Stevens and the fact that 
Mr. Stevens had a firearm. (R. 112, p. 315, lines 6-25). Based upon the investigation by 
Officer Ray, Officer Ray arrested the defendant. Ms. Quintero testified at trial that her 
prior statement given to Officer Ray, wherein she stated that Mr. Stevens was chasing 
them and had a gun, was a lie, (R. 112, p. 342, line 20 - p. 343, line 15). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
At the end of the prosecution's case, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge of 
criminal mischief based upon a lack of evidence that the defendant intentionally damaged 
the car hoist. The plaintiff argued that where defendant intended to hit Mr. Stevens, but 
missed, such intent should be transferred to the hoist and therefore defendant should be 
found guilty. However, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105, an intent to harm Mr. Stevens 
could only be transferred to another person, not property. For this same reason, there was 
insufficient evidence presented to support the jury's verdict of finding the defendant 
guilty of criminal mischief. 
During a brief recess in the trial, the defendant was seen by a juror in the hall while 
the defendant was wearing handcuffs. Defendant asserts that this event prejudiced the 
juror and the defendant moved for a mistrial. The court denied such motion after talking 
to the juror. The defendant asserts that the prejudice caused by the juror seeing the 
defendant in handcuffs could not be cured other than through a mistrial being declared. 
The trial court should have allowed the defendant to use evidence of Mr. Stevens' 
character, prior bad acts and the existence of an ex-parte civil stalking injunction obtained 
by Ms. Quintero, to impeach Mr. Stevens' testimony and establish that the defendant 
acted in self-defense. Such should have been allowed under the Rules of Evidence since 
to do so would have established Mr. Stevens' character for violence under Rule 404(a)(2) 
and a motive for the defendant's defense of himself as permitted by Rule 404(b). 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The defendant objected to Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 on the grounds that they 
mis-stated the mental state required for the offense of aggravated assault. The defendant 
asserts that the requisite mental state for finding a violation of the aggravated assault 
statute is limited to intentional actions. 
The defendant requested that his trial counsel interview and subpoena witnesses 
identified by the defendant who could testify as to Mr. Stevens5 threats against the 
defendant. However, trial counsel failed to do so. The defendant also requested that trial 
counsel obtain copies of certain tape recordings in which Mr. Stevens threatened the 
defendant. Counsel again failed to do so. Such omissions by trial counsel were 
objectively deficient and but for such deficiencies, the defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable outcome at trial. 
Despite knowing of and having access to the tape recordings, and despite a request 
for discovery from the defendant, the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant with copies 
of the tape recordings. By failing to disclose the existence of the recordings or provide 
copies of them, the plaintiff violated Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and established case law requiring that all exculpatory and mitigating evidence be 
provided to a defendant, even if not requested. Such failures violated the defendant's due 
process rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
In this appeal, counsel has determined that certain arguments of the defendant have 
some merit and therefore a brief filed in accordance with State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 
169-170 (Utah 1981) (following Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)), is not 
appropriate. However, counsel does believe that certain of the defendant's arguments do 
not raise meritorious claims. In order to meet counsel's obligation of effective 
representation of the defendant, while complying with counsel's duties to this Court and 
under the Code of Professional Conduct, counsel has separated those issues and 
arguments which counsel believes raise meritorious claims and those claims which the 
defendant wishes to have raised, under separate headings for the court's convenience. 
Counsel has conferred with the defendant at length in order to adequately set forth the 
defendant's claims. 
L The Defendant's Claims which Counsel Believes have Merit. 
A. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the charge of criminal mischief under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-106(2¥c>? 
Count 2 of the Information (Count 3 of the Amended Information), charged the 
Defendant with criminal mischief, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann § 76-6-
106(2)(c). Under such section, a person commits criminal mischief if such person 
"intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another." This charge was 
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based upon the defendant's collision with the car hoist. However, no evidence was 
presented by the plaintiff that the defendant "intentionally" damaged, defaced or 
destroyed the hoist. The plaintiffs evidence was limited to the alleged fact that the 
defendant attempted to hit Mr. Stevens with a vehicle and missed and hit the hoist. The 
plaintiff argued that the defendant's intention of hitting Mr. Stevens was transferred to the 
hoist and therefore the defendant was guilty of criminal mischief. See (R. 112, p. 384, 
line 8 - p. 388, line 8, attached hereto as Addendum 1.) 
The theory of transferred intent states that "Where intentionally causing a result is 
an element of an offense, that element is established even if a different person than the 
actor intended was killed, injured, or harmed, or different property than the actor intended 
was damaged or otherwise affected." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105. In this case there 
was no evidence whatsoever that the defendant intended to damage any property 
whatsoever. Thus, the theory of transferred intent does not apply. If the defendant had 
intended to damage Mr. Stevens' vehicle but instead damaged the hoist, transferred intent 
might be present. However, since, at best, the plaintiffs evidence could only show that 
the defendant intended to harm Mr. Stevens and no other person was harmed, transferred 
intent does not apply and the criminal mischief charge should have been dismissed. The 
defendant did not have any intent to injure any property and therefore his intent could not 
be transferred to the hoist. 
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B. There was insufficient evidence presented in the trial court to 
support the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of the 
charge of criminal mischief under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
106QXc}? 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2), for the defendant to be convicted of 
criminal mischief, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or 
destroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of 
another and as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
interruption or impairment of any critical 
infrastructure; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of 
another; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other 
object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, 
locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether moving or 
standing. 
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Additionally, 
For the defendant to successfully challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence underlying his conviction, he must show 'when 
viewing the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 
State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978) (citations omitted). In this case, the only 
evidence presented was that the defendant attempted to run the vehicle the defendant was 
driving into Mr. Stevens and inadvertently hit the hoist. As argued above, since the 
defendant did not intend to damage any property by his actions, the elements required to 
convict the defendant of criminal mischief were not established and the criminal mischief 
charge should have been dismissed, even when the evidence and all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. 
II. The Claims Raised by the Defendant 
A. The trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after the 
defendant at a recess in the proceedings, was seen by a juror 
while the defendant was in handcuffs and being escorted by a 
bailiff? 
In this case, at a recess during the trial, one of the jurors saw the defendant in 
handcuffs and being escorted by a bailiff. After this fact was made known to the trial 
court judge, the judge interviewed the juror regarding the encounter and determined that 
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such encounter did not prejudice the juror's ability to fairly decide the case. (R. 112 at p. 
270, line 12 - p. 282, line 22, attached hereto as Addendum 2). Defendant disputes that 
the juror could not have been prejudiced by seeing the handcuffs on the defendant and 
asserts that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial at that point. 
A brief and fortuitous encounter of the defendant in handcuffs 
is not prejudicial and requires an affirmative showing of 
prejudice by the defendant.... The jury's inadvertent 
observation of defendant outside the courtroom prior to trial 
did not "dilute the presumption of innocence55 so as to require 
a reversal absent evidence of actual prejudice. 
State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in original). The fact that the trial 
judge interviewed the juror in a noninflammatory way and determined that the juror was 
not prejudiced against the defendant would tend to cure any issue which might have been 
raised by the juror briefly seeing the defendant in handcuffs. Further, there is a lack of 
evidence in the record showing any actual prejudice. 
B. The trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to use 
evidence of past criminal convictions, currently pending criminal 
charges, and an existing ex parte civil stalking injunction against 
one of the alleged victims in order to impeach the testimony of 
such alleged victim or to establish the existence of threatening 
behavior by the alleged victim against the defendant and Ms. 
Quintero to prove that the alleged victim had a motive for 
threatening the defendant thereby supplying a basis for the 
defendant's assertion of self defense? 
Under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
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Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. — Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. — Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -- Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at 
trial. 
The courts have determined that 
In deciding whether evidence of other bad acts is admissible 
under Subdivision (b), the trial court must determine (1) 
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-
character purpose under this rule, (2) whether such evidence 
meets the requirements of Rule 402, and (3) whether such 
evidence meets the requirements of Rule 403. 
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State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238,1J31, 32 P.3d 976, 986. This however does not end 
the inquiry. "An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not, however, 
result in reversible error unless the error is harmful.... For an error to require reversal, 
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence 
in the verdict." Id. at P38, 32 P.3d 988 (citations omitted). 
Under Rule 607 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "[t]he credibility of a witness may 
be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness." Rule 608(a) provides 
that 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. 
Finally, under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), "evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment." 
In this case, the defense sought to cross-examine Mr. Stevens regarding past 
criminal convictions, currently pending criminal charges, and an existing ex parte civil 
stalking injunction against Mr. Stevens in order to impeach Mr. Stevens5 testimony of the 
events which led to the charges being filed against the defendant. Such evidence was also 
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sought to establish the existence of threatening behavior by Mr. Stevens against the 
defendant and Ms. Quintero to prove a motive for the defendant's assertion of self 
defense. (R. at 112, p. 191, line 13 - p. 214, line 25, attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
Based upon Rules 404, 608 and 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court refused 
to allow defense counsel to inquire into Mr. Stevens' past criminal convictions, pending 
criminal charges or the existence of the ex parte civil stalking injunction. By doing so, 
the trial court prevented the defendant from seeking to discredit Mr. Stevens' testimony 
based upon Mr. Stevens' prior obstruction of justice conviction or the prior threats made 
by Mr. Stevens against the defendant and Ms. Quintero. 
The emphasis of defendant's argument is that the trial court should have allowed 
the attempted cross-examination to show that Mr. Stevens was biased in his testimony 
since, as reflected in the written statements of the defendant and Ms. Quintero, the police 
report of the incident, and the ex parte civil stalking injunction, Mr. Stevens had made 
several threats against the defendant and Ms. Quintero causing them to fear for their 
safety. Since the trial court found that the past convictions did not fall within the 
requirements of admissibility under Rules 608 and 609 as bearing upon Mr. Stevens' 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and did not involve dishonesty or false 
statements by Mr. Stevens, such evidence was not relevant or admissible. However, such 
evidence would have established Mr. Stevens' character trait of violence under Rule 
404(a)(2). Additionally/such evidence certainly would have established the motive of the 
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defendant, as permitted by Rule 404(b) in seeking to defend himself from Mr. Stevens, 
which was the claim of both the defendant and Ms. Quintero in their written statements. 
If such evidence would have been allowed it is certainly probable that the jury could have 
taken a different view of the defendant's claim that he was acting in self defense. Such 
evidence was relevant under Rule 402 to the defendant's claim of self defense and would 
not have resulted in unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury, 
since an explanation for such evidence being used to prove motive could be easily 
communicated to the jury. Based thereon, such evidence should have been allowed. 
C. The trial court erred in overruling the objection of the defendant 
to Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, and in giving such jury 
instructions to the jury? 
At the time of the offenses alleged against the defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103, provided that: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses 
(A) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(B) other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
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The plaintiff proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, to which the defendant objected. 
See R. 112, p. 355, line 8 - p. 364, line 3 and Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 (R. 76 and 
77), attached hereto as Addendum 4. The basis of the objection was that such 
instructions did not require a finding of intent but allowed conviction based upon intent, 
knowledge or recklessness. The trial court ruled that since no mental state was specified 
by the statute, and based upon the way the statute was written, intent was required as to § 
76-5-103(l)(a) only, and an intentional, knowing or reckless state of mind was applicable 
to § 76-5-103(l)(b). Since the theory and evidence of the plaintiffs case relied solely 
upon § 76-5-103(l)(b), the issue is whether such section does apply an intentional, 
knowing or reckless state of mind. 
In In Re McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), under a version of § 76-5-103 
similar to the statute existing on the date of the alleged offense in this case, the court 
found that: "Under 76-5-103(1) (a) the prosecution must prove the defendant intentionally 
caused serious bodily injury to another, but under 76-5-103(1) (b) no culpable mental 
state is specified and thus under 76-2-102 "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Id. The application of a mental state based 
upon intent, knowledge or recklessness with regard to charges under § 76-5-103(b) is 
further bolstered by the fact that in 2010, the legislature revised § 76-5-103 to delete any 
reference to "intent" as an element of the crime of aggravated assault. Based on the 
above, the trial judge was likely correct in his ruling on the disputed jury instructions. 
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D. The defendant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show "(1) that 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists 
that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable 
outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, P6. Additionally, 
To demonstrate objectively deficient performance under the 
first part of the test, [the defendant] must overcome a strong 
presumption that.. . trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance. (Citations omitted). In addition, we give trial 
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not 
question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis 
supporting them. 
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (1996). Defendant asserts that trial counsel was 
ineffective based upon counsels' failure to interview and subpoena certain witnesses and 
failure to obtain certain tape recordings containing exculpatory evidence. 
i. Defense counsel failed to interview or subpoena witnesses 
identified by the defendant 
In this case, the defendant's main defense for his actions were based upon a claim 
of self defense in that the defendant's actions against Mr. Stevens were based upon Mr. 
Stevens' previous verbal threats and threatening actions against the defendant and Ms. 
Quintero. However, other than referring to the written statements of the defendant and 
Ms. Quintero regarding such threats and actions, defense counsel asserted no independent 
evidence. In fact, in connection with the ex parte civil stalking injunction obtained by 
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Ms. Quintero against Mr. Stevens, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 5, a 
written statement was filed with the court asserting that Mr. Stevens had threatened the 
defendant and Ms. Quintero. Additionally, other witnesses tot eh stalking were identified. 
Despite the existence of such statement and identified witnesses, and the fact that 
defendant had identified such witnesses to defense counsel, defense counsel did not 
contact such witnesses, subpoena them, nor seek to introduce such evidence. Had defense 
counsel done so, those witnesses could have established the prior threats and actions of 
Mr. Stevens against the defendant and such evidence would have bolstered the 
defendant's claim that he was acting in self defense in connection with his actions toward 
Mr. Stevens. Such evidence could certainly have resulted in the jury giving more 
credence to the defendant's self defense claim. 
ii. Defense counsel failed to acquire and offer into evidence 
copies of certain tape recordings of conversations between 
the defendant and the alleged victim. 
The defendant, in preparing his defense, informed trial counsel of the existence of 
certain tape recordings of conversations between Mr. Stevens and Ms. Quintero and the 
defendant. Such recordings were allegedly made by law enforcement officials working 
with Mr. Stevens in an attempt to obtain evidence against Ms. Quintero with regard to 
certain drug allegations. In such conversations, Mr. Stevens allegedly threatens the 
defendant. The plaintiff used an edited portion of such recordings during the defendant's 
sentencing to show that the defendant threatened Mr. Stevens. Despite having been told 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the existence of such recordings and their content, trial counsel did not obtain such 
recordings nor evaluate the content thereof for exculpatory evidence or for evidence to 
support the defendant's self defense claim. 
Had trial counsel obtained and evaluated the recordings, and had the recordings 
contained exculpatory evidence or evidence supporting defendant's self defense claim, 
such evidence could have been presented to the jury to establish that Mr. Stevens had 
threatened the defendant, that defendant feared for his life, and that the defendant was 
acting in self defense with regard to Mr. Stevens. Therefore, the defendant was 
prejudiced by trial counsels' failure to obtain the recordings. 
E. The prosecution willfully withheld certain tape recordings of 
conversations between the defendant and the alleged victim 
which would have been exculpatory of the defendant's actions or 
beneficial to the defendant's defense? 
As stated above, at sentencing in this matter, the plaintiff used an edited recording 
of a conversation between the defendant and Mr. Stevens to show that the defendant had 
threatened Mr. Stevens prior to the date of the incident which led to the criminal charges 
against the defendant. The defendant had requested discovery from the plaintiff and 
specifically requested any tape recorded statements or videotaped statements by the 
defendant and any evidence that will tend to negate the guilt of the defendant. See R. at 
15-16. Defendant had also requested supplemental discovery. The plaintiffs initial 
discovery response indicated that any and all statements made by the defendant, whether 
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written, recorded or oral, which were in the possession of the plaintiff were provided with 
such response and indicated that the plaintiff was unaware of any information which 
tended to negate, or mitigate, the guilt of the defendant, except as contained in the 
documents provided with such response. See R. at 10-11. The plaintiff also supplemented 
its discovery response, but the recordings at issue were not provided. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or 
codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
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Additionally, in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that the defendant had demanded that all exculpatory and mitigating evidence be 
provided by the State. The Court noted that 
the prosecution had a duty to disclose such evidence. Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 
(1963); State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-16(a) (1982). Indeed, due process requires the 
State to disclose even unrequested information which is or 
may be exculpatory. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 
1985). 
Id. at 849. 
The question as to what duty a prosecutor has to disclose 
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case depends on 
the nature of the evidence, whether the defense made a 
specific request for the evidence, whether the evidence is 
perjured, whether the defense knew, or, using reasonable 
diligence, should have known, about the evidence, and, to a 
certain extent, the conduct of the prosecution. The underlying 
concern is, of course, to make the judicial process a search for 
truth and not just an arena of competition between the 
prosecution and the defense. 
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have 
dealt with the standards that should be applied in determining 
whether evidence should have been disclosed by the 
prosecution. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 
215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), the Court held that the 
prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused, in the face of a specific request for the evidence, 
violates due process if the evidence is material either to guilt 
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or to punishment. Good faith of the prosecution in such an 
instance is irrelevant... . 
This Court has recognized that a deliberate suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence which is material to the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is a denial of due 
process. State v. Stewart, Utah, 544 P.2d 477 (1975); Butt v. 
Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957). 
State v. Jarrell, 608 P. 2d 218, 223 - 224 (Utah 1980). 
While the defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective based upon 
such counsels' failure to obtain copies of the recordings at issue at defendant's request 
may tend to negate the argument that the plaintiff failed to disclose and produce unknown 
recordings, it goes without question that under the above cases, the plaintiff had a duty to 
disclose the existence of the recordings and produce the recordings without the defendant 
requesting the recordings. Most certainly, the plaintiff had a duty to disclose and produce 
such recordings in response to the defendant's initial and supplemental discovery request, 
even if the defendant did not specifically request such recordings, and based upon the 
plaintiffs continuing duty of disclosure. The plaintiffs failure to disclose and produce 
the recordings which contained exculpatory evidence violated the defendant's due process 
rights and justifies granting the defendant relief from the jury verdict in this case and 
ordering a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, the defendant respectfully request that this Court reverse 
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a mistrial and remand the case to the 
trial court for a new trial. In the alternative, the judgment and verdict against the 
defendant should be vacated based upon the failure to provide the defendant with 
discovery in violation of the defendant's due process rights, failing to afford defendant 
effective assistance of counsel, failing to allow the defendant to cross-examine Mr. 
Stevens as desired, failing to properly instruct the jury with regard to the mental state 
required for aggravated assault, and failing to dismiss the charge of criminal mischief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this<Sb day of June, 2011. 
GanKr. Kuhlmann 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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eyewitness identification instruction. 
MR. CRAMER: Okay. And, Your Honor, as 
was said in My Cousin Vinny, we've given a good, 
logical, reasonable argument; motion denied. 
THE COURT: I remember that. All right. 
Any other instructions we need to talk 
3bout? 
MR. CRAMER: No other instructions from 
us, Your Honor, and I believe that covers all of the 
State's proposed instructions, and I think we're set 
on that. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll have them 
ready down to Number 17, then we'll have to talk about 
self-defense instructions and the last two stock 
instructions and that we'll be able to do at 8:30 
tomorrow. 
I also — I think I gave you the verdict 
form, didn't I? There's nothing very interesting 
about that. 
And so, if there's nothing else, we — 
MR. CRAMER: Well, Your Honor, I think 
that we still need — Mr. Taylor needs to make his 
motion to dismiss on prima facie, and then we'll be 
completed. 
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MR. TAYLOR: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead with that. 
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Like Mr. Cramer stated at the last one, 
I'll make a general motion to dismiss for the State 
failure to meet its prima facie case regarding 
probable cause as to each of the counts, 1 through 
five, and then I would just have some specific 
arguments as to just a couple of the counts 
themselves. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. TAYLOR: With the Court's ruling as in 
regards to the Aggravated Assault with the reckless 
being a part of the elements, and that, I would make 
it as to Count II which is I believe the one that 
relates to Mr. Evans if my memory serves me correctly. 
The testimony, and that, that was given in 
regards to Mr. Evans as it relates to the alleged 
assault: First of all, I don't believe there was any 
testimony by anybody that Mr. Cecil ever had any 
intent whatsoever to hurt Mr. Evans. I don't believe 
Mr. Evans said so, the officer, I don't believe there 
was any testimony at all by Mr. Stevens that 
Mr. Stevens had — his testimony was that when they 
came back into the parking lot of the Chevron, that he 
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Mr. Stevens tried to hit him but never saw anything in 
regards to Mr. Evans. 
I think the officer's testimony was that 
Mr. Cecil said that he saw Mr. Evans, that he may have 
been close to him but he didn't hit him. And I 
believe that Mr. Evans' testimony was that in his 
opinion, I heard him coming, I jumped back out of my 
way, he said, in fact he — I think his testimony was 
that I don't know that he would have even would have 
hit me. And he was always — seemed — his testimony 
and it (Inaudible) to that — actually, said that the 
way his eyes was fixed, that he always concentrated on 
Mr. Stevens. 
So I would say, based upon that, that the 
State has failed to meet its prima facie burden as 
regards to the Aggravated Assault that's alleged 
against Mr. Evans. 
MR. WEILAND: Your Honor — not meaning to 
interrupt. Oftentimes, rather than going through it, 
could we just do it like charge by charge rather than 
going through all the arguments and then having me go 
all the way back and forgetting some? I mean, I don't 
know if — 
MR. TAYLOR: I don't have a problem if 
380 
that's what he wants to do. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEILAND: I have a very short term 
memory. • • 
THE COURT: Go ahead then, Mr. Weiiand, on 
the Count II, aggravated assault. 
MR. WEILAND: All right. Your Honor, with 
regards to Count II, we believe that under 76-2-105, 
which talks about transferred intent, that says where 
intentionally causing a result is an element of the 
offense what — that element is established even if a 
different person other than the actor intended was 
killed, injured or harmed. 
And so we believe that under — if his 
intent was to as the statute shows that his intent was 
to hit Mr. Stevens and that he went directly after 
him, if he -- if he — and because he was so close 
there at the time that it caused fear and alarm in 
Mr., you know, Evans, we. believe that also can be met 
with that same act. 
I know that the evidence is — and even 
the Defendant's own — the testimony is that the 
officer asked him, he said, yes, he did have to jump 
out of the way. 
And so I would argue that the intent is 
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ras to kill — to get Mr. Stevens; however, by doing 
o, he also caused an aggravated assault against 
Ir. Evans because (Inaudible) right next to him and 
oth of them (Inaudible) and he — all the — it's 
ncontroverted evidence that he had to jump out of the 
/ay to avoid being hit himself. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. WEILAND: And so we believe that there 
; a prima facie case for that count under the 
ransferred intent statute. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Mr. Taylor? 
MR. TAYLOR: Our argument would be to 
hat, Your Honor, is that if he's going to argue 
ransferred intent, then he can't be — either he has 
o argue specific intent and he was specifically 
rying to hurt Mr. Evans or he has to argue general 
ntent, that — in other words, he can't say that he 
vas trying to -- either he has to say he specifically 
rying to hurt Mr. Evans or he was specifically trying 
o hurt Mr. Stevens. He can't say that. 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
MR. TAYLOR: He can't be arguing reckless 
vhen he's arguing on the specific — transferred 
382 
ntent — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TAYLOR: - there's no such thing as 
xansferred reckless. 
THE COURT: Yes, I want to look at that 
because I don't think that's... (Inaudible). 
Well, I kind of go a different direction 
A/ith respect to the charge of Aggravated Assault as to 
Mr. Evans. I think the evidence which has been given 
f it were taken by the jury in the light most 
"avorable to the prosecution, it would be sufficient 
for the jury to conclude that Mr. Cecil in using the 
elements instruction, intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly committed an act with unlawful force or 
violence that caused or created a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to Mr. Evans. 
I don't know that the jury could 
necessarily — well, I guess, the jury could, again, 
if they took everything in the State's favor, conclude 
that Mr. Cecil intentionally attempted to do bodily 
injury. 
The threat — the threat element of it 
doesn't really apply to the situation regarding 
Mr. Evans. But I think more so committing an act with 
unlawful force or violence that can cause or created a 
383 
2 could conclude constituted an aggravated assault again 
3 with the second element being added in. 
4 So I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss 
5 Count II with that record. 
6 Well, okay, I think that's enough on that. 
7 What's next? 
8 MR. TAYLOR: All right. Count III, I 
9 believe, is the Criminal Mischief. This one here I 
10 think that the State has failed to meet its burden of 
11 proof even on a prima facie level even giving all 
12 inferences in favor of the State. In fact, I don't 
13 think there are any inferences. I believe the State 
14 has to prove even at prima facie level that he 
15 intentionally damaged, defaced or destroyed the 
16 property of the other, in this case the hoist or the 
17 lift. 
18 There's been no testimony whatsoever that 
19 it was his intent to damage the lift. There has been 
20 testimony that he saw Mr. Stevens there and he was 
21 trying to hit Mr. Stevens, but that's not having any 
22 intent whatsoever to damage the lift. 
23 So I don't think that even viewed in the 
24 light most favorable to the State even with all of the 
25 inferences found in their favor, I don't think there 
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1 are any inferences that he had any intent to damage 
2 that Chevron's lift. And I would ask that that one be 
3 dismissed. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Weiland? 
5 MR. WEILAND: And, Your Honor, I believe 
6 there is a — a theory. And if I could, I would like 
7 to draw the Court's attention with a picture, State's 
8 Exhibit Number 2, specifically the photograph taken of 
9 the lift and the area — we would argue that that 
10 statute is a specific intent with the intent to 
11 destroy - damage the property of another. 
12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
13 MR. WEILAND: In that picture... 
14 (Discussion off the Record.) 
15 MR. WEILAND: Mr. -- the facts of the case 
16 was that Mr. Stevens was behind that — I mean, if I 
17 could, there was -- when asked — there was — does 
18 this accurately depict - he says, "Well, everything 
19 but the police car was not there." He says, "The car 
20 was not there." In fact, he was in front of the 
21 police car. And if you look, there was a trailer 
22 right there. 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MR. WEILAND: At that angle, he had to go 
25 through that — in order to hit Mr. Stevens behind it, 
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o u p l e of pictures, the way the d a m a g e is done in the 
rehicle on itself, it isn't — I m e a n , it's not ii)le 
iff tl me side,, 
I would argue that that w a s his intent, 
lis intent was to get Mr. S t e v e n s a n d des t roy any th ing 
n its way to get it, and that's why he gunned it and 
t went so hard to cause that much d a m a g e , the damage 
- f )int bumper. And I believe t h a t he p u s h e d on 
:he gas in ai i effort to he I lad tc destroy t h e 
3roperty that was in the way to get at ! 1r. Stevens. 
., A id sc I lb Eilie 'e tl r si e is a pi ii i 1a i ';::: ::i s 
:ase based 01 IIle evidence that he did, in fact, 
jestroy property of another based on — you know, the 
evidence that he revved his engines and gunned it and 
l e w e n t fast. 
1he testimony is that there was 
significant damage to that front bumper . It's a 1976 
3 M C which the testimony was with those massive steel 
oumpers with all that darn lage. We believe it was his 
intent to destroy the property ii i the way to getting' 
at t In, Stevens. 
I I IE COI IIRT: O k a v 
don't question that there 
I lis lb! ii i I J : Eiiii II: i it I do disp : ite tl lat tl lei e 
386 
MR 
i fas damage t 
2 I u n d e i s ta i i el 1 11 , \ c i I a i " I" s a i g 11 n i c: i 11 :::::i m i c l I 
3 hadn't thought ' )f it that v a> , But I think it's 
4 certainly a reasonable argument to make . 
5 Ai id so I'll Ilea /e Count III in i. I'll : Jenny 
6 the motion to dismiss on that, leave Count III in for 
"ii t l ie purpose of le t t ing the ji iry d e c i d e t h a t i s s u e • 
8 another of intent. Interest ing. 
9 Okay. Mr . 1 aylor? 
10 MR . T A YILO R i I h e o n II) ' :»t II i' EI r < i in 11 I - J" c : 11 c l 
11 argue based upon the State's argument just barely is 
12 b a c k to the accident involving property d a m a g e . And 
13 their argument is that he intentioi lalh damaged that 
il t 111 t till nei I  I don't fhiinll* : that Count I can s tand. 
15 THE C O U R T : Let's (Inaudible) 
16 MR. C R A M E R : -- based upon the idea - if 
it was an accident, it's that argument we've been — 
18 THE COUIR I : i e 5, tl ie ai gi mei it f i r n the 
19 prelim 
20 
21 M R . W EI LA, I J D : A n d!, i c 11 II Hi o i i : i" , i t: II i !: I i a I 
22 again i, i i ly a r g u m e n t is that I don't believe the 
23 legislature intended to include accidei 
2*1 I I  
25 includes an intentional act. It's not just as we 
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was ever an\ evidence that was — can even allude that 
it was his purpose to destroy or damag 2 til ril:: lid. I h 
testimony was, yes, he revved his engines and he sped 
and he hit the lift, but the idea he was trying to run 
over Mr. Stevens,, that there was never an \ test imon > 
whatsoever at least not that I heard that he purposely 
tried to damage that lift. 
Mr. Evans -- Mr. Stevens was behind the 
lift and the lift may have been there, but there was 
never — no testimony at all his purpose was to damage 
tl LE rll lifll 
I I Ill I : I , ,. 1 II tl i( ' ;t :JI : 
interesting at guments. In 1 in > /ie " til 1 use are good 
arguments for the jury to hear . I th ink the de fense 
has a perfectly credible, appropr iate a r g u m e n t that 
there wasn't any evidence of an intent to damage 
deface or destroy the property of another so the jur > 
could not find element two of Criminal Mischief. 
Mr. Weiland has a good argument that the 
ii itcnt was tc jar 1 iage tl iat |:; re pet 1: / so he ::e 1 1  Id get: to 
the person behind it: 1 think both of those are 
arguable under the evidence that the jury has be- -
it And so I tl: link I need to gi \ e the instruction and 
c t - _.ry to decide whether they th ink there was 
sufficient evidence of intent rather than m e mak ing 
387 
• 10 
1 1 
1- 5 
I : 
often refer to as an accident, I believe that, you 
know, if you intentionalII\ c a u s e damage to another 
car, that it is your duty to stick around and give the 
s a i i i e i i i f c i i r 1 a t i c 1 11: h a t y o u n o r m a 11) N o u I cl 
I don't believe that their in tent "as to, 
all right, ii ') 01 1 intended: to cause the accident, then 
t h e r e f o r e ) ou don't need to stick around. I think 
what they mean by accident is when two vehicles 
collide or when there is a collision, you need to 
stick around and provide the same information that you 
1 lor malllhy i 'ould. A n d it 's not broadened to say, oh, if 
": ' ::::)! 1 inter ided the act, ther 1 tl lerefore you'r e fi ee to 
THE C O U R T : So how do 1 kno\ « < 1 rhat the 
legislature intended? 
f 1R WEILA1 IE : :: ' - e l l I 1 r : a n II: :;: • ••• I 
mean — m y questior1 is I don't know what they meant 
by accident. I m e a n , did they — the definition of 
"accident," does that include an intentional act that 
caused — or does it just mean 
r H IE C 01J R r: \ / e 11, 11 u s u a 11 > cl 0 e s 1 1'" t, cl 0 e s 
it? I m e a n , if someone 's c l i m b i n g if someone 's 
cl imbing to Angels Landing and jumps off eyes wide 
open , we wouldn't call that an accident, we'd call it 
a suicide. 
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^Luncn Kecess.) 
T H E C O U R T : Retun ining to the record 
ithout the members of the jury and without a 
osecutor for that matter. 
II IR: I' i LOR: IT ifit/'s Till right \ , n don' t 
?e :l lrii li ri"]. 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
T H IE C 01JIR I : 1 I 1 e I  a s t j u r o i j i i s 1: a r i i v e d 
i c !< s o \ ' e ' re re a d) I: o lb i i i i g t II :i e ji i 11
 : in it i i 11 i I  e s s 
ere's something we need to talk about . 
MR. C R A M E R : Youi I \ Dnor there 's a couple 
things f r o m t h e Defense perspecti \ e. I think that 
e re was an inadvertent situation, Inaudible) 
snspor ted all here a juror saw Mr. Ce nil in til le 
ick being taken back to his cell. I believe he was 
handcuffs, he i fas sti l l ir i his court room clothes. 
T H E C O U R T : Yes. The officer ment ioned 
at to me. Again, \ Til yc u describe while ' /e're here 
i the record where Mr. Cecil was when that juror came 
ick. 
A VOICE: Yes, Judge. We were exiting out 
is door after we had b roke, and she was walking down 
e corner of the hall. It \ /as " 'ei > I  )i net, 
O n c e I recognized her, we were probably 
27 0 
T H E C O U R T : Yes. Do y o u th ink s h e did see 
ecognize that he was in handcuffs? 
VOIC jon't believe she would of — 
out in the hall, the door hadn ' t evei i 
mpletely closed. I just opened the door , brought 
7i back in a n d let her continue on down the hall. 
T H E C O U R T : Okay . 
Wha t do you think? 
MR C R A M E R : Well , Your Honor , I think I 
IOW what the Court will say, but I think the Court 
:eds to understand where I'm coming from again. I 
ways h a v e t o look at these things from an appellate 
igle as wel l as f rom a trial ang le . 
T H E C O U R T : Of course. 
f IF! C R A M E R : '! r I .1 think that tltn case In - < 
cleai that if something happens that gives a juror 
impress ion that your cl ient is in cus tody , then 
at gives them, kind of a prejudice aga ins t h im that 
ey fee l : "We l l , he's in cus tody, then he must be 
ill s I ' )i ii ., ' 
I think the appropriate resolution would 
to — I don' t know whether you talk to a juror 
out it, but we 'd move for a mistr ial on those 
ounds to preserve that a rgument , 
T H E C O U R T : f'es, 
I IR. C R A ! 1'ER: Because 1 think flu it it could 
ejudice him and she could very well go into 
liberations and say, "Well, I saw him and he w a s 
271 
nere ay she seen the back of him. 
IE C O U R T 
V O I C E : ( 
handcuffs 
•] i 
audible) recognize that he 
9 A V O I C E : I was right behind her and I saw 
10 the door open and then step out, and like he said , 
11 the door hadn't even closed and they backed out. And 
I — from her impression of her leaving, I don't think 
13 she t hough t an\, th ing -- I don't e 'en I  mow if she 
recogn ized h im as being the Defendar it or ai i 
than me escoirtii ig the ji \r) ' out into the hal lway. 
I HE COURT: Uh-huh. 
A VOICE: But, again, that's 
THE COURT: r> 
A VOICE: I can only speculate on what she 
thought. 
THE COURT: what do you think that 
22 juror saw? 
:\ T l IE DEFENDAf IT: I'm n : t si ire. I I :no ' she 
J"4 saw my hands behind me b a d : "I /I metll mer or not she saw 
netal on my wrists or what, I don't know. 
_ _ _ 272 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: I can't say. 
3 T H E C O U R T : Was it a matter of maybe a 
4 second or v as it s e cenail seconds? 
5 IE D E F E N D A N T : Yes, it was very brief, a 
I couple of seconds , maybe . 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
c W h e n you had Mr. Cecil come back in the 
9 cour t room, hov. I : . 
10 A V O I C E : I just opened the door asked him 
11 to step back inside. Put my hand right on his 
12 shoulder and sa id , "Step back inside." 
13 
14 Well , Mr. Weiland, w h a t d o y o u t h i n k ? 
15 MR. WEILAND: (Inaudible) probably get 
16 more details f o r t h e r e c o r d . I m e a n , h o w wide is the 
17 hallway? 
18 
19 I IR "'" EILAir ID: P r :;! ' vith that door? 
20 A V O I C E : Three and a half, four feet, 
21 maybe . 
22 MR. W E I L A N D : And with that door open 
23 would you say it's half the distance in the hallway? 
24 A V O I C E : Right (Inaudible). 
25 MR. WEILAND: And you are on the other 
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A vi J iL t : Yes,, we had exited the door, the 
joor frame 01 i the other side of the door as it opens. 
MR. WEILAND: And you were in the one half 
of the hallway which you had a perfect view of the 
11 ill 01 Il 
A V O I C E : Yes. 
I IIP: \ VEII ANE Where was Mr. Stevens - - I 'm 
5C ii i : I In G E!' ::iiili Il 
A V O I C E : He as right to the side of me . 
I II E l l AI Ji: : II i igill ml i I! in I I • it ia < 
3 clear y 'iev ' of the jure " as ' iill: 
A VOICE: I'm sure he did. I didn't ask 
iim if he had seen her. 
MR WEILAND: I mean, I -- and then -- and 
low long i ;:, that — 
Ma /be a max of two to three 
seconds, It: was very \ er\ t rief As soor as 
•ecognized that it was the jury member, I turned him 
around ( Inaud ib le) . 
I" 'ill : ' ' 'El l I ID: i \> : I II i- : n ) :: >i i c I: ' 5 " : • : I t i l i 
ury member , was she looking at your — 
A V O I C E : She; I : ::ik:e :I she was looking at 
ne. 
MR. WEILAND: Yes. 
2 jus t specu la t i on for all of us . If cou ld ve ry < -ell! 
3 h a v e appeared to her like Mr. C e c i l \ / a s being directed 
: it rolled by the office :* : u ld h a v e looked 
5 I! i k e !: I I c i D f f i :: e r I s h o I d i n g t h e d : ' c i c p' 2 n a i ;:J s a i ' 
6 Mr. Cecil and the juror in the hall and m a y b e that was 
lot — that's someth ing I'd already instructed them 
8 i :>t t :» ha e happen, so he had Mr. Ceci l go back ir it tl i: 
9 r o o m s i n c e there's no place really for a juror to go 
10 except dov m the hall. 
1 1 e l l ' »f E :a i g :) s|i: call :  tie: f Ills "l! ill BI t ii 
12 chambers if you want to? 
13 I don't want to -- y o u Iknov • b) 
14 quest ioning, emphas ize something s i le hasn't even 
15 tl i in! iglhf a b :>uit, But I suppose one approach would be to 
just to say to her: "I understand that you and 
Cecil happened to be pass ing in the hall, was 
18 there anything about that, that concerned you?" I 
19 don ' t knov ". T h a t m a y suggest to her that maybe she 
20 missed someth ing that she should have been concerned 
2 1 about. 
22 MIR : i R A J AE\< .: / e l l i n icT it e ju >ll „ 
2 3 I k i: in o ' ' t in c C : ' 111 t' s f: n : It: a II: I ^  a I n e?. :i) re a cl 
24 instn ictions about not communicat ing or talking. 
25 THE CO! IRT: i es„ 
2:7(3 
And did she - ' i /as there an \ noticeable 
expression on her face? 
A . I d N 
MR. W E I L A N : All right. And th you 
mmediately just put him back in? 
A '(ZflCE: Yes;, I brought him back in here. 
I IF! 'H i Aj n: : j 'OLJI ;! ibjie :t t :> a 
nistrial. I don't think — at this — you know, we 
lave no information that the juror even sav ' hiiin i, it's 
'ery brief. There was a - even kind of some version 
hat it was very brief, but he doesn' t even know that 
-he sa v' l'iii n. 
Il IF ! CIR AMER: i c: nr I Ion : r the : i ih tl ling I 
vould sa \ in i i ebuttal , briefly, is just that there 
eally is no \ 'on know, he's being escorted b) lav ' 
enforcement, although it's probably not physically 
)ossible for t 
: sounds like they were face to face. Still the fact 
3 he was being escor ted , his hands v ei e II: el lin ::! I mis 
>ackjf he was t aken back by lav t e n f o r c e m e n t into the 
lourtrc ::in i, i on n kno , iiit;"'s an in fe rence that he is in 
Taylor wasn't there, 
t's not like we were all walking out en mass as the 
)«, tense t e a m . 
THE COURT: And how might it have appeared 
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1 I IR C R A M E R : Just to a:^  oid the - you 
2: I ;: i : " ', y e s S o i i i e t y p : D f i i i a p p m o p r i a t e p e i c 2 |: 11 o n i,, 
21 i e r anything went badly or not. Perhaps the Court 
4 c ould ask I ier in terms of that just sa> : "It is my 
5 i understanding from the bailiffs that you weir e lea\ ing 
6 at the s a m e t ime, sav v N Ii Ceci l in the hallway. Can 
you just tell me what your impression was?" Just ask 
I her and open-ended question. And perhaps the Court 
9 could just" do tl lat in camera with :)i it i is hei e bi it itl i 
10 the record going so that she wouldn' t feel 
THE C O U R T : And the ont\ place tl lat I'd 
12 have to do that is in the courtroom here because I 
13 can't record in chambers with court going on over 
14 there. 
15 f IR. C R A M E R : Oh , okay. 
16 THE COURT: Wel l , I might be able to, 
17 actually, by switching the camera in there , but then 
18 they wouldn't be getting a record of whatever it is 
19 they're doing so , 
20 MR. C R A M E R : Okay . 
21 T H E C O U R T : What do you think 
22 Mr. W e 
23 I 
24 m e a n — and I'll defer to the Court. I'm just — it's 
?i
~ you know, when you say, you know, "Don't think 
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T H E COURT: Yes 
MR. W E I L A N D : And that situation here 
J S'I ::: asking more into it: If she bi it if there is 
a (I n a u d i lb I e) :) f i i ;;; I" i"' : ir i o i t s } o u s a) , "' If I e ) , I 
understand that you saw Mr. Cecil in the hallway and 
to a oid the appearance : f iiri|: ' o| i<it: die:
 : :: j am it: t :» 
tell us about it? Did you see anything?" I don't 
know. 
MR. CRAMER: I think that would be 
appropriate. I would ask the Court to do that again 
just looking to complete a record. 
T H F : C O U R T ' : I II i-l lu lh '« es, I would like to, 
\ /ell 
f 1R C R A M E R : And again i I'm irlLh ::o JII isc::l! 
[ don't want it to be something that we flag her to: 
i/Vhy are they asking me that? So, if we could do it as 
/ery low key. 
THf". : :OUR I : i es. 
1 1R. C R A M E R : I'm afrai :l itl'i fill1 ,: Cc Litl: 
sitting on the bench it's not going, to be able to be 
ow key just because of the natural authoritative 
:: : sitioi i tl •: Court holds. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) authority more 
:han that. 
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2 caution, Your Honor . 
3 T H E C O U R T : — a s s u m i n g whatever it is s h e 
4 saw or thought, or I don't know t her experience is 
5 and w h a t she might conclude. 
6 Bu t I ill g ) ah :::a :!! a n d ::!' :» 1:1 lat. I ::::t's 
7 recess here and get set up. And then if you'll come 
• •: i me 'c'll get: Ms Ml ::t i to come in and speak to 
9 me in just a m i n u t e . 
10 I low, I'm going to have to tell her what to 
11 tell the other jurors about her coming to talk to 11ie, 
12 Ill I \ oi il ::! tell I EI is til lat as ji ist t : t: fUll till v ::: 
13 :: 11 i e if j u r ::) if s a s s f i e .:: :» I e a if n g , s I i e p a s s c ::!! II: > 
14 somebody in the hallway. A n d I jus t wanted to know if 
15 anything had been said - I don ' t even want her 
Ill:) I'll instruct her: ""Don't: tell anybody who it y /as 
I at you passed." And I think, you know, she seems 
18 pretty ' si i • t a id conscientious, and I think that 
19 she'll do that. 
20 MR. C R A M E R : That will be fine, 
21 i our Hoi IOI , Thank you. 
22 T H E COURT: Okay. 
23 NIR. W E I L A N D : Your Honor. I'm just 
24 (Inai idible) which juror — Ms. Allen? 
25 T H E COURT: Ms. Allen (Inaudible). 
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I don't know what to tell you 
MR. CRAMER: Is it ~ we don't have 
:ourt reporters anymore. 
f IR FA i 'LOR: Is there any persona l 
•ecording device that could be used? 
THf" 001 IRT: Not realty I si ippost: je 
:ould go into Judge Shumate's chaii nfaeirs if he's not ii i 
here He's gc t: the stand alone thing. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) idieo recorder? 
THE COURT: Yes, for video,, I v 'ouldn't 
;ven necessarily w a n t her to know that it was being 
•ecorded. 
MR. CRAMK-R: ( J k "!: til" ill : that --
THE C O U R T : We started it: and then --
MR. C R A M E R : Just start it and have I teir 
:ome in. 
I, IL w O U R l : ( Inaudible) ask her to come 
n. 
MR CRAMER: Just have the Court chat with 
ler. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) in the chairs. 
MR. (IRA! HER: \ es. 
THE CO! IRT: 1 1a\ be v ie sh sulci qn > »itli that. 
think we better do that because I don't want 
Inaudible) 
1 [ IR. W E I L A N D : Do we have two Ms. Al len 's 
2 
3 T H E C O U R T : f h : e on! I nave :::>! ie left 
4 MR. W E I L A N D : O h , that's right, okay. I 
5 know who you're ta lk i i g alb :m it 
6 T H E C O U R T : Yes, Ms. Allen with the dark 
7 hair. 
8 (Recess.) 
9 1 I HE C O ! J R T : Aga in , reti irning to the record 
1 0 A ' j 11! ! 1 I I o (; c I j r t < \ i t h M r C e c i I a n d C o u in s e I! f c if t h e 
11 part ies, i i :)t the members of the jur ) We couldn' t 
12 if i lake the recording equipment work in J u d g e Shumate's 
13 chambers. And so we just went into my chambers, the 
14 Clerk, the Bailiff and I and were there, a n d ve 
15 I jght Ms. Allen in a n d 1 sa id to her — I can ' t say 
16 it exactly, but I said that I had jus t heard that s h e 
1 7 I! lad inadvertently passed s o m e - passed Mr. Cecil ii i 
18 the hallway, and I just wondered if there was anything 
19 that concerned her about that. And she said — she 
20 said, "No, the Bailiff h a d o p e n e d t he Joo r and I saw 
21 him then i i and I jus t put my head dio\ -n and didn't make 
22 any eye contact." And she I said Was there 
23 ait lything that concerned "y ou or did anybody say 
24 anything?" She sa id , "No. Not at all." 
25 
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;ometmng or, you know, had a question about it And 
hen I asked if she had said anything to anybody on 
he jury, and she said, "If k , And tl ten I said,, "Well, 
vhen you're going back, they may wanted to know why I 
vas talking to , u so I'd like to have you just tell 
hern that you inadvertently passed somebody involved 
n the case in the hallway and I just wanted to know 
"there had been anything said.1111 Oka\ And I t ill ;ll 
' E;! i : 11 o s c ": " I i : • i t z s t I  i a I: s I i E: I  11 ::l p <E s s E: :i i 1 i 11 1 • 1 
lallway. And she seemed very clear on that. 
So I think, at this point, I won't declare 
1 mistrial. I think we're oka) on that score. And 
he didn't seem to be - she didn't seem to be 
:oncerned while she was saying she was not concerned, 
: you understand what I mean. She didn't indicate 
mything otherwise in her demeanor or tone of voice or 
if 1 j tl nit ig at all. 
MR. CRAMER: Okay. Fhank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything on the record you 
ited to make on that, let's do that. 
MR. CRAMER: Thank you, Your Honor. No. 
The only other record I would make is that 
believe the State's next witness is Ms. Quintero. 
1y only concern 01 
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MR. I( A/EILAND: I'm sorr> N our Honor, I 
MR CRAMER: If heir testimony is going to 
>e such that: she is going to sa\ undiet oat! i til lat she 
ed on this witness statement form, tlleim I think she 
eeds to be represented! and I doi i't want to be 
bjecting in the middle of heir testimony and saying 
he needs an attorney before she either perjures 
erself here or admits to perjury by saying that this 
; a lie. 
THE COURT: Okay, 
MR. CRAMER: So if that's going 1: :» be tl 11 : 
ature of her testimony, I think she needs to be 
^presented air id it need::', to be dc " '" n :) /, 
THE COURT: /fiat do you know about that? 
MR. WEILAND: 1 our Honor, I had spoken 
nth her at length. I informed her that, you know, 
he could be looking at possible charges of the — you 
now, writing a false report to police officers, a 
iiass B Misdemeanor, and she goes "I don't care. I'm 
filling to testify truthfully ," and thai " what she 
'ants to do. 
And so she has been advised. But she 
3\s, "I want to testify truthfully." And if you want 
) bring her in and ask her certain questions yourself 
len that's fine. 
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2 MR CR A M E R : A n d tha t ' s f ine if that"s 
3 * wants to do. But I still think that she 
-1 represented before she makes such a 
5 decision 
6 THE COURT: She needs to at least be 
7 advised that she 
MR. CRAMER: She needs to be advised of 
9 her rights and I think she needs an attorney because 
hether :ne County decides to press charges or* not 
11 now, I mean, that may be an issue later down the i oad. 
12 I don't want to -
13 THE COURT: \ Vhere is she? 
14 MR. \ 'EILAJ Jill : She's right uulLsi Jin. 
15 . THE COURT Oka") 
16 Let's bring herjn and see what her 
thinking is about that. 
MR. CRAMER: We could grab maybe Mr. Terry 
19 or somebody from next door and see 
20 1'HE COURT: Let me ask: her if sh ;;• ants 
21 to. If she declines and she has ai i opportur lity, I 
22 think that is her choice. 
3 MR. CRAMER: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 
-•4 THE COURT: All t iigl it hat's ) • 1 1 n a i l 1 
ma'am? 
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1 'IS. QUINTERO: Anjelica Quintero. 
MR. WEILAND: Your H o n o r -
THE COURT: I Is jinttn 0 
4 MR. WEILAND: I just wanted to be sure 
6 1E •! 0 u R l : i e s J e " a i 11 10 i 11 a II :: e s u i c 
you're recorded. Can you come up and take a seat on 
8 the witness stand. You'll be up here soon, 
9 apparent! > , I here's something that the attorneys have 
II) i i Dtified n ic :>f that I need to ask ) ou about :\ndl so 
I I a g a i r i in 0' t: h a t / c u' re n e a r a m i cro p h 0 n e, \ / 0 u I d ": 01 in 
say your name again please? 
III3 I IS. :;)! I l l ITER I): AnjeliCc 1 Qi tin it 
I HE CO! J'Rl : An j '" :>u"re going t :» be called 
I 5 F: 
16 written statement to the police officers at an earlier 
/ 1jint back in March or early April, is that right? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And it's been suggested that 
»our testimony today might be different from what you 
21 said in your written statement? 
THE WITNESS: \ es. 
THE COURT: Is there a possibility of 
hat? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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U. Did you tell the officers everything 
"uthfully the first time? 
A . Yes. 
MR. WEILAND: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Y MR. TAYLOR: 
Q. Your full name is Michael Paul Stevens? 
A . Yes, it is. 
Q. What is your date of birth? 
A. January 16, 1974. 
Q. So how old are you now? 
A . 35. 
Q. 35? 
How long did you date Anjelica, is it, 
uintero? 
A. Anjelica. 
Q. Okay. How long did you date Anjelica? 
A. For a few months starting in November. 
Q. That would be November of 2008? 
A . Yes. 
Q. And about approximately what time did you 
:op dating her? 
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A. January. 
Q. What type of a relationship did you have 
ith her? 
A. We had, for the most part, an exclusive 
ilationship. 
Q. Did you ever get in arguments? 
A. No, not really. 
Q. What caused you to stop seeing her? 
A. Just because I just didn't have an 
iterest in seeing her. She showed more her true 
)lors, and I didn't have an interest in that and I 
idn't want to be around it. 
Q. At some point in time on the day in 
jestion here, on the 30th of March of this year, did 
)u make a statement to Officer Ray, who's right here, 
lat Anjelica thought that you were out to get her for 
stting you arrested on a marijuana charge? 
MR. WEILAND: Objection, Your Honor. 
MR. TAYLOR: It's a statement made by a 
arty in interest in the matter. 
MR. WEILAND: May we approach? 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, there's a 
jestion of evidence I've got to discuss with Counsel. 
I have to excuse you to the jury room, so I 
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2 about it freely. We'll get you back in just a few 
3 minutes. 
4 (Jury Leaves.) 
5 THE COURT: Okay. First of all, 
6 Mr. Taylor, tell me what it is you want to go into on 
7 this line of questioning? 
8 MR. TAYLOR: The only thing that I was 
9 going to ask him was just simply the statement that he 
10 made to Officer Ray in the police report where he had 
11 mentioned that Anjelica Quintero — that he was out to 
12 get her for getting him arrested on a marijuana grow 
13 up on Pine Valley Mountain, and that he has pending 
14 charges — 
15 THE COURT: What's the relevance of that? 
16 MR. TAYLOR: It goes to the statement that 
17 hasn't been into evidence yet, but Mr. Weiland alluded 
18 to it that Mr. Cecil and Anjelica Quintero had 
19 contacted law enforcement regarding threats that had 
20 been made to them by Mr. Stevens and this was 
21 Mr. Stevens' response to the officer as to why would 
22 they — why would such a call have been made in the 
23 first place to dispatch. 
24 THE COURT: Yes. But I'm still wondering 
25 — so, what is the relevance of that information even 
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1 if it is correct? 
2 MR. TAYLOR: Well, the relevance is, is 
3 that — our whole side of the story has to do with 
4 this issue of self defense. If Mr. Stevens had made 
5 threats to Mr. Cecil and Ms. Quintero, and that this 
6 was the underlying reason regarding that Mr. Stevens 
7 was out to get Ms. Quintero for allegedly calling law 
8 enforcement in regards to a marijuana grow. It shows 
9 bias for one thing, as to, you know, the statements 
10 that he would make but also it's directly related to 
11 who's chasing who. In other words, is there an issue 
12 of self defense? 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 MR. TAYLOR: It gets to the underlying 
15 reason why Mr. Cecil or Ms. Quintero would be alarmed 
16 by Mr. Stevens' presence in the first place. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Weiland? 
18 MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, if the question 
19 is about regarding threats, he could ask specifically: 
20 "Did you make any threats?" But I think it's improper 
21 to talk about — I mean, he can't be impeached on a 
22 criminal matter that he hasn't even been prosecuted 
23 on. There's no conviction and so just bringing up — 
24 alludes to this marijuana grow. I think it's 
25 impermissible. If he wants to ask about: "Did you 
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regarding sometnmg mars rotany irrelevant, 1 tninK 
it's improper. 
THE COURT: Well, improper why? 
MR. WEILAND: Well, number one, it's a 
prior bad act and under Rule 60 — sorry. 
THE COURT: Well, we're probably talking 
about 404B, "Where evidence of other crimes or wrongs 
or acts is admissible for purposes of proving motive" 
and other things. 
MR. WEILAND: Right. And then what -- and 
I would believe that it falls under any of those 
categories. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Taylor is suggesting 
it — he's trying to show that this witness has a 
motive to — to not tell the truth because he's been 
accused of something by the people that were on the 
other side of this dispute. 
MR. WEILAND: Well, to not tell the truth 
and that's why he's been chased off the side of the 
road. I just don't see the connection. 
THE COURT: Not telling the truth about 
whether he even was chased off the side of the road. 
I mean, that's the Defense theory of it, so he wants 
to suggest a motive for the witness to not tell the 
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truth. Even if that's the case, though, Mr. Taylor, I 
don't know why — I don't know why it would be 
relevant what particular accusation had been made 
against Mr. Stevens. 
MR. TAYLOR: As far as — you mean the 
marijuana grow itself? 
THE COURT: What's the women's name? We 
keep calling her 14 different versions. 
MR. WEILAND: It's spelled Anjelica, but 
it's Anjelica, and that's why I (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, so Anjelica? 
MR. WEILAND: Yes. 
THE COURT: Quintero is that the last 
name? 
MR. WEILAND: Yes. 
THE COURT: What difference does it make 
what she might have accused Mr. Stevens of doing? 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, maybe it goes to - it 
goes — I mean, it's Mr. Stevens' own statement in the 
investigation of the matter (Inaudible) the officer 
asked him, you know, "I received this call and they 
said that you were making threats." Because the 
officer is out looking for Mr. Stevens. Why — and 
then he asked him why would — you know, "What's with 
this?" And this is his reason for it. 
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statement/ 
MR. TAYLOR: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: What did he say specifically 
in his statement? 
MR. TAYLOR: According to the officer, he 
said that they had broken up a few weeks ago. He said 
he was arrested recently for the marijuana grow in 
Pine Valley. He said that for some reason Anjelica 
thinks he's out to kill her for getting him arrested. 
And then when he went on and said that Michael told 
him that he never made any threats to Anjelica or 
(Inaudible) or Michael claimed he didn't know. 
MR. WEILAND: And so, if anything, he's 
saying to the officer he's never made any threats, and 
now they want to bring in the fact that he thinks 
Anjelica — he said that he thinks Anjelica is upset 
at the — I mean, I don't see how it comes in. 
THE COURT: Yes, I'm having real trouble 
finding a straightforward analysis through that. 
MR. TAYLOR: It also goes to the 
(Inaudible) bias — if he has pending charges against 
him in the Fifth District Court and the State has 
flown him down here from the State of Alaska, he has 
pending felony charges here, I think that there will 
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always be (Inaudible) bias — 
THE COURT: Does Mr. Stevens have pending 
felony charges? 
MR. TAYLOR: He does. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is he presumed innocent 
like Mr. Cecil? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, he is. 
THE COURT: Okay. So what can be said 
about that, that's not unfairly prejudicial to a jury? 
MR. TAYLOR: I think it goes to bias as to 
whether or not the State has made any type of 
agreement with him in regards to his case (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, that's not what you were 
asking him about though. 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, no, I'm asking him 
about that. But I would be eventually be asking him 
about that. I guess we just try to cover all of the 
bases now. 
Also I think under 6-13, prior statement 
of the witness, could come in as well, I think. 
THE COURT: For any purpose and any prior 
statement? 
MR. TAYLOR: Unless it's unduly 
prejudicial under (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, all 613 says, though, is 
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assumes tnat tnere'd De relevance behind the whole 
discussion. 
MR. TAYLOR: I think if Mr. Stevens -- he 
can clarify and say, you know, he didn't say. 
THE COURT: Well, let's go back to your 
question, though, okay. What was it you were asking 
Mr. Stevens when we got derailed? 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, I just asked him if he 
made that statement to Officer Ray. 
THE COURT: The statement that, "Anjelica 
thinks I'm trying to get her"? 
MR. TAYLOR: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEILAND: I mean -
THE COURT: That far--
MR. WEILAND: Well, I mean -
THE COURT: To go that far or to ask the 
witness about his statements. We're not speculating 
because apparently it's his written statement. 
MR. WEILAND: No, it's not his written 
statement. You see, it's speculation. The officer 
says, "Why you think Anjelica" — or "Why do you think 
they're upset?" And he's speculating to the officer 
why he thinks that — I mean. 
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2 THE COURT: Can you just ask Mr. Stevens: 
3 "Didn't you tell the officer that Anjelica had accused 
4 you of committing some crime and you thought that she 
5 was afraid you were trying to get revenge?" Or 
6 something like that? 
7 MR. TAYLOR: I could certainly ask that. 
8 However, I still think that it's admissible for me to 
9 ask him whether or not he has any pending felony 
10 charge here for the bias as to whether or not — you 
11 know, is he receiving some benefit or motivation in 
12 regards to this case that's somehow going to help him 
13 in his pending felony matters in this very court. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I don't know the 
15 charges, per se. 
16 MR. TAYLOR: (Inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: Well, as you know, charges per 
18 se don't mean much of anything to me when I'm trying a 
19 case. Why should I let you talk to the jury about 
20 that? 
21 MR. TAYLOR: Well, I guess - it goes to 
22 the bias, that he's able to work out a favorable plea 
23 agreement or whatever he might be able to work out in 
24 his case. 
25 THE COURT: You know, we can talk a long 
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THE COURT: Yes, that's true. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's his opinion, though. 
THE COURT: But if Mr. Stevens is required 
to testify and if he testifies consistently with his 
written statement, he could be asked about that. And 
if he had an opinion or some reason to have an 
opinion, he could express that same opinion, that he 
thinks that Anjelica — it gets too complicated when 
you say it that way. 
I guess, Mr. Taylor, what I'm trying to do 
is find a way for this to be expressed that's not just 
essentially mudslinging. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'm not --
THE COURT: That he has his own criminal 
charges, therefore the jury should conclude something 
or the other. And that's not what you're trying to 
ask him about, and that's not what you're trying to 
do. But I'm trying to find a way to express that 
isn't — to the jury, doesn't come out that way. 
Can you think of some way to do that? I 
nean, you're doing it by way of leading question, 
which is, of course, fine from your side of it, but if 
ihere's something in your leading question that is not 
admissible or that is unfairly prejudicial, then I 
:an't let you use a leading question that way. 
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1 time about that. 
2 MR. TAYLOR: And you can just say — 
3 either answer "yes" or "no". 
4 THE COURT: And slap a lot of black paint 
5 all over the witness and come out with nothing except 
6 the black paint; or do you have any evidence that 
7 there's any kind of plea agreement? 
8 MR. TAYLOR: I do not. 
9 THE COURT: Has there been anything 
10 offered to Mr. Stevens related to his case and 
11 connected to his testimony in this case? 
12 MR. WEILAND: There had been an offer but 
13 it has been rejected and then I — we — I'm informed 
14 last night — I mean, we could ask him out there: 
15 "Have there been any promises made to you regarding 
16 your other case?" 
17 THE WITNESS: No, I did reject the offer 
18 that was proposed to my attorney. 
19 MR. WEILAND: And then he wanted to handle 
20 this case and then — get it over with before you made 
21 any exception of any other offer and that was with 
22 Brenda Whiteley. 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MR. WEILAND: Has - and I guess I should 
25 have asked, but there's been no promises made to him 
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m t u j u K i : Yes. 
Well, Mr. Taylor --
MR. WEILAND: I mean, I don't mind him 
jsking: "Have there been any promises made to you for 
'our testimony today?" 
THE COURT: I'm not sure. That's a plain 
ranilla kind the question. 
MR. WEILAND: Well, (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) the question 
hough of suggesting that the witness has criminal 
harges against him still is one that I'm not very 
appy with because charges are charges, not an apt 
xpression but charges are a dime a dozen, anybody can 
ave charges. Mahatma Gandhi had charges, Jesus had 
harges, you know, Martin Luther King had charges. 
MR. TAYLOR: I agree with Your Honor from 
lat perspective. 
THE COURT: And so the specifics of what 
lose charges are, I think, goes too far and becomes 
nfairly prejudicial because it just suggests to the 
iry something that hasn't been proven, hasn't been 
5tablished and really may never be. But I — I think 
nee there are charges pending, it would be fair for 
\e witness to be asked if he has criminal charges 
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ending and if anybody's — if he's made a deal with 
le Prosecution related to his testimony. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Now, you can ask that and 
lowing what the answer is going to be, I don't know 
at it helps, but that's kind of up to you. But I 
ink to suggest that this is the nature of the 
larges and — I think that goes too far. 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
MR. TAYLOR: I should probably bring this 
), too, as long as the jury is out. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TAYLOR: We do have a (Inaudible) 
linion, a couple of prior convictions that have to do 
th crimes of moral turpitude in our — the role that 
i are also going to question him about. Whether he 
d a prior criminal history on two specific charges. 
THE COURT: What are they? 
MR. TAYLOR: One of them is attempted 
struction of justice in 2005, and the other is 
:empted to sell or supply alcohol to minors in 2004. 
THE COURT: Now, how would those be 
missible because I know that they — the Court of 
peals has had all kinds of grief. In fact, I've 
3rd it directed to the (Inaudible) opinion about the 
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2 know whether we'd know what crime of moral turpitude 
3 is, but how would those two be such that they would be 
4 relevant to his credibility? 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, on the - (Inaudible) 
obstruction of justice, I guess, has to do with 
dishonesty, with truth and veracity, I take it. 
THE COURT: Do you know what the facts 
were? 
MR. TAYLOR: I do not know what the facts 
of the case were, just that he has the conviction. 
THE COURT: Because obstruction of justice 
might be someone at the door saying: Is so and so 
home and the person saying, "No, he's not." You know. 
I suppose that's a lie. It's not a big thing in my 
mind, but it is prosecutable. 
MR. TAYLOR:. The rule itself talks about 
truth or — that sort of thing. It doesn't use the 
words crime of moral turpitude, of course, 
(Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Were either of those felonies? 
MR. TAYLOR: They are not. 
THE COURT: Felonies. 
Well, I'm kind of trying to go through the 
list, and think of good permissible ways for those to 
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be used, but I'm not coming up with it. 
Okay. Under Rule 608: Credibility can be 
attacked by specific instances of conduct. But that's 
not really what you're talking about here. You're 
talking about just a charge. 
The evidence qf bias, bias, prejudice or 
any motive to misrepresent. I would allow you to ask 
him about pending criminal charges and whether he's 
made a deal for his testimony. 
MR. TAYLOR: So I could ask him whether he 
has any pending criminal charges? 
THE COURT: Is that objectionable? 
MR. WEILAND: I mean, again --
THE COURT: I guess it does suggest more 
than — yes. Maybe I just have to restrict it to 
asking him if he's made any agreements for his 
testimony to get any benefits. I just don't want 
to — you know, I just don't want to open a can that 
has odor in it and has nothing else. There's no 
conviction, no evidence that could be given about this 
specific charge. I'm not sure why this is so hard for 
me this morning. I mean, I had a good breakfast, I 
should be able to think through this. 
MR. TAYLOR: And this also relates to 
Officer Ray. I mean, eventually, when we get to 
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about the calls and that, that came in to him. I 
mean, his investigation where he's deciding why 
Mr. Cecil and Ms. Quintero make a phone call to him 
and tell him that they're fearing for their life if 
there's absolutely no explanation that can be given. 
I mean, Mr. Stevens gave his explanation as to why he 
thought that was. He didn't say he did it, he just 
said this is my explanation, this is what I 
understand. 
MR. WEILAND: Ms. Quintero is here, and 
she could testify -- they could ask her directly. 
They could also ask Ms. Stevens directly: Have you 
made any threats? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
I'm still just struggling to find • 
probative value in that written statement of this 
witness that is greater than the prejudicial effect. 
I guess that's really what I'm struggling with, and 
I'm just not finding it. 
MR. TAYLOR: One other that I intended to 
— you know, unless the Court has a problem with that, 
with Mr. Evans, made this statement as well, that as 
far as his relationship with his stepbrother, the one 
time stepbrother, that they had — they didn't have 
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essentially much of a relationship because he thought 
that he, once again, used drugs and there was a safety 
issue for his family. That's essentially his words 
that's also in the statement. 
THE COURT: Okay. But how does that 
relate to anything relevant to this case? 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, part of our defense and 
what we're looking at, of course, is the Court would 
eventually give a self defense instruction. And if 
he's made calls to law enforcement and said that 
threats were made. 
THE COURT: Now, who is it that "he" 
you're talking about. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'm talking about Mr. Cecil 
and Ms. Quintero. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TAYLOR: So that it gives some reason 
then as well as, you know — you know an officer says 
on the stand that Mr. Cecil and Ms. Quintero both told 
law enforcement that they saw Mr. Stevens with a gun 
in his waistband. 
THE COURT: Well, certainly they can 
:estify about that. Reports of threats being made 
still are marginally relevant at all. Again, anything 
:an be reported to somebody else. And to ask Officer 
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directly relates to the crime itself that we have for 
trial, I just don't see that as being anything other 
than just kind of a self-serving statement, I guess. 
Observations related to these crimes is what we really 
ought to be focusing on. 
Well, Mr. Taylor — I don't know, I'm just 
not — I would allow you to ask the witness whether he 
has made any agreements with the Prosecution or 
anybody else to testify in a particular way in order 
to get an advantage in something he's interested in. 
You could ask him whether he's made any threats. 
What else is it that you really wanted to 
know about? 
MR. TAYLOR: The only other thing that I 
think I would ask him regarding this sort of thing is 
whether he's aware of the ex parte protective order, 
stalking injunction that was entered by Judge Shumate 
about four days after this occurred — 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. TAYLOR: - in which he names 
Mr. Cecil as one of the protected persons; he was 
served with it. 
THE COURT: But it was ex parte, no 
hearing? . . 
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MR. TAYLOR: It just still says the 
ex parte order, so I'm assuming that there was not a 
hearing, but he was served. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TAYLOR: And it was signed. 
MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, if they'd like 
to open that up, that's fine because in that it was 
filed after the fact, and I've already alleged to it. 
There was not any mention of any gun whatsoever. 
THE COURT: Yeah, you did, you did mention 
that. 
MR. WEILAND: But I'm not offering it into 
evidence. 
THE COURT:. U.h-huh. 
MR. WEILAND: I'm just going address 
Ms. Anjelica about it. 
THE COURT: You see, that's the problem 
with the stalking injunction and the protective order 
procedure, particularly stalking injunctions because 
if somebody is served with one of those, it still is a 
one-sided, unheard, untested allegation, and the party 
who receives it may just ignore it. That doesn't mean 
that anything has been proved. 
MR. TAYLOR: I wasn't going to ask him 
about it other than she was aware that there was an 
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i nc L U U K I : I nars aDour me same as 
asking if there are charges pending. If they haven't 
been tried, if they haven't been heard by a Court, 
they're just charges, they're just allegations, and I 
just don't think that — I don't know, I just have a 
problem with that as evidence because I think it 
suggests something to a jury who may — who would have 
no reason to understand the stalking injunction or 
protective order process; it would suggest more to 
them than it really means. 
Do you understand what I'm saying? 
MR. TAYLOR: No, I understand where you're 
coming from. 
THE COURT: Ex parte stalking injunctions 
only mean that somebody wrote up a good petition, 
that's all it means. The Judge doesn't weigh it, the 
Judge just says: It alleges enough; bingo, there's 
your ex parte stalking injunction. 
Then if we have a hearing, it may be a 
whole different matter. 
To me it's just the same as the pending 
criminal charges. It may well be the case, but I 
don't see it has any particular relevance even to 
credibility unless you get evidence that there's been 
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some kind of a deal made related to pending criminal 
charges. 
MR. TAYLOR: Sure. Did the Court have a 
problem with Mr. Evans testifying about what he stated 
to the Officer about his relationship with his 
brother? 
THE COURT: Tell me again what that was. 
MR. TAYLOR: Essentially he told the 
Officer that he didn't have much of a relationship 
with his brother because of -- he said that he used 
drugs and that (Inaudible) safety issue for his 
family, something to that effect. 
THE COURT: I guess that would still be a 
question of what specifically it is that Mr. Evans 
knows as opposed to what he suspects, because if it 
was just suspicion, certainly he's entitled to act on 
it but it's not — it wouldn't be relevant evidence. 
I mean, I suspect lots of things in the 
course of trials that, you know, aren't proved. I 
just have to kind of push those aside. 
MR. TAYLOR: Can I question him as to why 
he made a statement as to detail? 
THE COURT: That--
MR. TAYLOR: Mr. Evans. 
THE COURT: As to why he made the 
211 
z MK. IAYLOR: In other words, why he would 
3 suspect him if he had any actual knowledge of — 
4 THE COURT: Well, you could certainly ask 
5 him if they had any kind of--what their relationship 
6 was, and if his answer was, "It wasn't very close," 
7 then the relevance of why it wasn't close goes into 
8 Mr. Evan's speculation mostly, unless you're going to 
9 have Mr. Evans testifying that Mr. Stevens came down 
10 to the shop and used drugs while he was watching, and 
11 even that, I don't know how that's relevant to 
12 anything that Mr. Stevens is saying today. 
13 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, I guess we just put our 
14 objection on the record. 
15 THE COURT: Yes, and I hope I'm not 
16 missing something here, but I'm just not finding that 
17 line through one of the rules that I'd like to in 
18 order to let you question him about that. 
19 MR. TAYLOR: Just have to determine 
20 whether or not Mr. Cecil testified or not (Inaudible) 
21 somewhere so... 
22 MR. WEILAND: If I understand correctly, I 
23 take this also as a motion (Inaudible) the State that 
24 there will be no mentioning of any arrest of 
25 Mr. Stevens regarding a marijuana grow in Pine Valley 
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1 several months prior? 
2 THE COURT: Yes, I don't see any relevance 
3 to that in itself, and I see some clear danger of 
4 unfair prejudice, and so I don't think that could be 
5 asked about. 
6 MR. WEILAND:. All right, thank you, Your 
7 Honor. 
8 (Discussion off the Record.) 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Taylor, anything 
10 else we ought to be discussing before we get the jury 
11 back? 
12 MR. TAYLOR: Not that I can think of. 
13 I'll probably think of something (Inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Yes, I know how that works. 
15 MR. WEILAND: I believe, from the State 
16 (Inaudible) jury probably appreciated this time to 
17 stand. 
18 THE COURT: Probably so. 
19 Do we need a break? Does anybody here 
20 need to go out before we continue? 
21 MR. WEILAND:, Your Honor, I just need to 
22 talk to him briefly. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Let's take just five 
24 minutes. 
25 (Recess.) 
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vvt: d ie UCIUK on trie record witn parties, 
ie witness, Counsel, not the members of the jury. 
I went back to find my notes, and I 
>uldn't remember which session it was/but I found it 
om the District Court conference this year in May. 
•ofessor Medwed from the University of Utah Law 
:hool did a discussion on Rule 608 and 609, and 
iafs where we are on this, and I think what I've 
mcluded, I'm satisfied with. There is one thing 
iat I wanted to point out for Mr. Taylor on these ~ 
there are past convictions that Mr. Stevens has and 
ey are not more than ten years' old and if a 
mviction involves dishonesty or false statement, 
en that is admissible and you may inquire on that. 
The problem with just having the name of 
e charge is that obstruction of justice might be 
ssing a joint out the window of the car, which 
>esn't involve false statement. It might be: No, 
)Solutely not, I haven't seen him for years, and it's 
>mebody who's hiding behind the couch. You know, 
at kind of thing, which would be a false statement. 
), if you know what that is and it is a dishonesty or 
Ise statement that could be inquired into; if not, I 
ouldn't be able to allow that. 
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MR. TAYLOR: (Inaudible) underlying impact 
naudible) factual basis for that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
All right, have we got the jury back? 
MR. CRAMER: One more thing. We just 
anted to put on the record that both witnesses were 
here during this entire discussion because they are 
ctims and they're allowed to be in the courtroom. 
jt during this discussion of what is their testimony 
at may be asked of them, they were here. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Good point, 
>od point, thank you. 
All right. Let's get the jury back in. 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
(Jury Present.) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
THE COURT: We'll continue then with 
Dss-examination. 
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Mr. Stevens, I believe that you testified 
at you went to see a friend at the Adobe Ridge 
rcle? 
A . Yes. 
Q. Apartments there? 
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tnat rriena about, do you remember what you went to 
see that friend about? 
A. I went to see him to get $200 that he owed 
me. 
Q. Were you able to — was he able to make 
that payment to you or — 
A. Oh, no, he had avoided me for a couple of 
days. 
Q. Was he there? 
A. No, he wasn't. I talked to somebody that 
was at his residence. 
Q. Do you know about how fast you were going 
when you drove into the Chevron the second time? 
A. The second time I went into the gas 
station? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. When I was being chased? 
Q. I believe that was your testimony. 
A. I wasn't paying attention to the speed. 
It was faster than I would have normally gone into the 
station. 
Q. Would you say that you were speeding? 
A. Well, I don't think the station parking 
lot has a speed limit, but I definitely was going in a 
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little quicker than if I was just going to get gas. 
Q. Have you had occasion to see the — hasn't 
been introduced yet by the State — but have you seen 
the video that the gas station made of the event? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. You've never seen that video? Okay. 
Did you drive between the diesel pumps? 
A . Yes. 
Q. And went around to the — around the back 
side of the station, drove up alongside the hoist and 
stopped? 
A . Yes. 
Q. That was your testimony. 
And how far would you say that Mr. Cecil 
was behind you? 
A. My guess was 10, 15 feet. 
Q. Okay. So he was just following right 
along just right behind you? 
A. Came up to a stop, 10, 15 feet behind my 
vehicle. 
Q. You got out of your vehicle and was 
standing by the hoist? 
A . Yes. 
Q. Now, did you just pull right up to the 
hoist and get out of the vehicle, get out of your 
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me. 
And so if you will come back tomorrow 
lorning at 9:00, we'll have those instructions all 
*ady to go and we'll start reading them. And it will 
3ke us probably an hour to do the final jury 
rstructions and the closing arguments, and then it 
rill be time for you to reach your decision. 
Any questions? 
Okay. With that, then, I'll excuse you 
or the evening. You can go out with the Bailiff and 
'II see you tomorrow morning at 9:00. Thank you. 
(Jury leaves.) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. The members 
>f the jury have left. The door to the hallway is now 
:losed. 
Let's go ahead with defense motions first. 
MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, don't know if the 
lourt wants — it seems for us logical from our 
Derspective to talk about jury instructions first 
Defore Mr. Taylor does his motion. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me tell you 
what I have then and we can work from that point. 
Let's see, I have most of the remaining instructions 
in order here. There are two Instruction Number 9's 
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2 intent in there is intentional. There's no knowing or 
3 reckless in it. 
4 THE COURT: Now, there are two 
5 possibilities: It's the causing bodily injury or 
6 using a dangerous weapon. 
7 MR. CRAMER: Correct. 
8 THE COURT: Are they the same mens rea for 
9 both of those? 
10 MR. CRAMER: Well, we submit, Your Honor, 
11 because — was it's all one statute. 
12 Under circumstances not amounting to a 
13 violation of 1(a) just means the serious bodily injury 
14 isn't created, but that the person uses a dangerous 
15 weapon or other such means or force likely to produce 
16 death or serious bodily injury. 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MR. CRAMER: So really the only difference 
19 there in Subsection b is, well, it didn't cause 
20 serious bodily injury but it was likely to. So the 
21 difference there is not really the mens rea, the 
22 difference there is what happened for exactly the same 
23 purposes as we have here, and that's why it's charged 
24 as a third, because under Subsection 2, 1(a) is a 
25 Second Degree felony. Then, if a serious bodily 
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in any stock instructions as you're aware, and I would 
use the one that provides that the Defendant has the 
absolute right under the Constitution to remain 
silent. That one's, obviously, the one that applies 
here. 
Number 10 is the mens rea, definitions of 
"intentional knowing and reckless." 
Number 11 I have is the elements of 
Aggravated Assault, and I've used the one that 
Mr. Weiland prepared and just put a number on it. 
MR. CRAMER: And that's the one we have 
the question on, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CRAMER: It seems to us that 
Aggravated Assault as laid out in the statute of 
76-5-103 is a specific intent crime, that it has to be 
intentional. 
76 5-103 (1), person commits Aggravated 
Assault as defined in 102, which is the definition of 
"assault." 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CRAMER: And he intentionally causes 
serious bodily to another or under circumstances not 
amounting to a violation of Subsection 1(a) uses a 
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to 
355 
1 injury happened, Subsection 3 1 B is a Third Degree 
2 Felony. The serious bodily injury didn't happen, but 
3 I because it was likely to: 
4 THE COURT: Use of a dangerous weapon ~ 
5 MR. CRAMER: Correct. 
6 THE COURT: - or other means or force 
7 likely to produce. 
8 MR. CRAMER: Right. Now, the dangerous 
9 weapon statute, I think — as an and aside — is 
10 Constitutionally vague. But in this search for the 
11 circumstance, a vehicle can clearly be considered one. 
12 So I'm not going to argue that. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Weiland had that defined 
14 as any item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
15 injury — 
16 MR. CRAMER: And that's true, Your Honor, 
17 that -
18 THE COURT:. ->-. and then had the facsimile 
19 part, which is not something we need. 
20 MR. CRAMER: Right. And I think for this 
21 case that would be well. Realistically, an envelope 
22 could meet that definition if it had anthrax in it. 
23 THE COURT: Right. 
24 MR. CRAMER: So that's just an aside. 
25 I think that the mens rea on that 
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can't be knowing — 
THE COURT: Now, on every element of it or 
on the use of a dangerous weapon? 
MR. CRAMER: I think - I think on A under 
the jury instruction — I think that B and C, there's 
a difference there, and Ithink that's the problem 
we're having. I think it's intentional. It's a 
specific intent all the way through. 
But we've got two statutes that are mixed 
here, one that allows knowingly, intentional, reckless 
or this one under which he's charged which requires 
intentional. 
So I think that this would have to be 
rewritten to mirror 76 5-103, and the Jury Instruction 
should only include language of intentional. 
I think it's like the aggravated — or the 
attempted murder statute. It's a specific intent 
crime, and that's what you have to prove. 
THE COURT: Oh, but 103 incorporates the 
definition of "assault," and then adds A and B as the 
aggravated parts. So we'd have to have a normal 
definition of an assault. 
MR. CRAMER: Okay. 
THE COURT: Or otherwise the jury would 
358 
just be left to ponder what assault really means. 
MR. CRAMER: I understand, but -
THE COURT: So that's Mr. Weiland's 
element number one. 
MR. CRAMER: Okay. 
THE COURT: But then the element number 
two, I do understand, I think, you're argument that 
that's an intentional rather than any one of the 
three. 
Now, wherever it is, the statute also 
provides that if the mental state is not specified, 
then it can be any one of — 
MR. CRAMER: That's correct. 
MR. WEILAND: 76-2-102, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah, okay. 
MR. CRAMER: That's correct. And I 
stipulate to that, Your Honor. But this statute, 76 
5-103, has a specific intent element in it. 
THE COURT: It does as to 1(a), certainly. 
MR. CRAMER: Well - and I think it does 
as to 1 B, as well, Your Honor, unless the Court's 
going with under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of subsection 1(a), and those circumstances 
being a different mental intent, a different mens rea. 
But I really don't think it is. I think it's more a 
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assault as opposed to the mental intention here within 
that statute. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, correct. 
All right. On that one point, 
Mr. Wei land, what's your, response? 
MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, my argument is 
that — as to 1(a), there is a specific intent 
(Inaudible) intentionally. And the State legislators 
specifically did not include any mental element as to 
1 B, and that's for — that's why you have the fall 
back position of 76-2 102 which says that and when a 
definition of the offense is not specific, does not 
specify of a culpable mental offense and that offense 
is not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. 
We believe that the State Legislature was 
clear in that Count I A does include intentionally, 
and that's why also the violation — I'm now reading 
off Subpart 2. It's a violation of subsection 1(a) is 
a Second Degree felony because it does require that 
enhanced, strict — or I mean the enhanced mental 
element. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
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MR. WEILAND: But when - and then it 
says, "One — under Subsection 3, violates subsection 
1 B is a Third Degree Felony. And I believe that they 
— the State legislature reviewed that and says that 
they do have the specific intent to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, then it is a further 
enhanced or there is a — I call it as general intent 
include recklessness while under Subsection 1 B, and 
that's why it's only a Third Degree Felony. 
If Counsel is saying it's the same mental 
intent for both, then my argument would be that it all 
— the entire statute should be a second agree felony, 
and not — but since they differentiated it, they 
wanted to — they meant to include, and they 
specifically did not include a mental state, and 
that's why we need to go to the fall back of 76 2-102. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. 
MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, in rebuttal, I 
would only submit that the only difference between 
1(a) and one B is that in 1(a) someone did have 
serious bodily injury, and that's what makes it a 
second degree felony, not the mental intent. 
In 1 B, there was no serious bodily injury 
but could have been, and therefore that's why it's a 
third, not because of the change of manner intent. 
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MR. CRAMER: Otherwise, they would have 
written it differently, that you had to have a 
Decific mental intent for both elements. 
MR. WEILAND: Brief response to that: If 
lat was their true intentions, they would have a 
erson — well, after the — a person commits 
ggravated Assault if he commits assault as defined 
nd he intentionally semicolon — or colon — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WEILAND: -- and so that's why it does 
ot include both. But they separated it, and they put 
he specific mental element in 1(a) and not 1 B. 
THE COURT: Yes, I understand that 
inalysis. And that's the way I would read it 
>bjectively. 
Now, if intentionally were meant to 
qualify both A and B, then it would either be stated 
n both A and B or it would be put before the colon 
3nd before A and B. 
The only way I can divine legislative 
ntent is from the way they constructed the statute 
tself, and I think that's correct. 
Now, that being said, Mr. Weiland, are you 
going to be arguing that Mr. Cecil recklessly used a 
362 
vehicle or — 
MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, in light --
THE COURT: - willingly or intentionally. 
MR. WEILAND: Yes, I'm going to argue all 
three. I mean, with the arguments from counsel that 
I'll - during cross-examination, well, isn't it true 
that he — you know, you were standing in the way? I 
mean, I believe the evidence is different, but I would 
like to leave that open to, you know, be able to argue 
that that was his intent. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Well, okay, with that record, I'm going to 
consider it as an objection to instruction 11, and 
overrule the objection. I'll give element two the way 
it is written there, because that is the way that I 
would understand the statute even though it's a bit 
incomplete to state intentionally in one part of it 
and then just state nothing in another part. But I 
think that's the way I would understand that. 
All right. Other any other points on 
these elements ~ 
MR. CRAMER: No, Your Honor. If the Court 
would just go through with the rest of the 
instructions, and if we have objections, we'll make 
them. 
3R3 
2 Aggravated Assault instructions that Mr. Weiland 
3 prepared. 
4 13 is the definitions, act, bodily injury 
5 and dangerous weapon, but I would eliminate the B part 
6 of dangerous weapon and just include the any item 
7 capable part because it is not a facsimile (Inaudible) 
8 we're looking at here. 
9 Now, on the Criminal Mischief element, 
10 there was something that — oh, I recall what it was, 
11 and we had this in a trial not long ago involving 
12 another charge of Criminal Mischief. 
13 And then is the question whether the value 
14 of the property is something that the jury is to 
15 decide. If they are, we need a special verdict for 
16 that because otherwise we don't know what the jury 
17 decided. 
18 So, if we tell the jury that it's - they 
19 need to decide the value of the property with at least 
20 a thousand dollars and less than $5,000, then that 
21 needs to be in the verdict form as part of the special 
22 verdict. 
23 It can be done. It's just that it's a 
24 little more complicated than a normal guilty or not 
25 guilty verdict. 
364 
1 Is that what you were thinking of doing 
2 with that element? 
3 And let me tell.you: In the other trial, 
4 we eliminated that element, but I think it was because 
5 the defense in that case stipulated that if there was 
6 damaged caused, it was at least a thousand. And, in 
7 fact, I think in that case it was more than 5,000, but 
8 the Prosecution had charged it as a Third Degree 
9 Felony. 
10 Was that your case? 
11 MR. WEILAND: That was my case, 
12 Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Which case was that? 
14 MR. WEILAND: That was State v. Stevens. 
15 MR. CRAMER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
16 That's the one we did three weeks ago. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. That's right. That's 
18 right okay. 
19 MR. WEILAND: So, I mean - what I recall 
20 is that we also just left that element in, that it was 
21 just a — one of the final elements and they must 
22 prove that it was a — and then what we did was — 
23 (Inaudible). 
24 MR. CRAMER: (Inaudible). 
25 MR. WEILAND: Yes. It was at least a 
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INSTRUCTION NO. W 
The following are the elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault, as charged in Count 1: 
1. The defendant: 
a. intentionally attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another, to wit: Michael Stevens; or 
b. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly threatened, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
c. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly committed an act, with unlawful force or 
violence, that caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another; and 
2. The defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly used a dangerous weapon 
If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or Ic, and 
element 2, you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of Aggravated Assault. 
If you do not find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or lc, 
and element 2, you must find the defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. !$L 
The following are the elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault, as charged in Count 2: 
1. The defendant: 
a. intentionally attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another, to wit: Todd Evans; or 
b. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly threatened, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
c. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly committed an act, with unlawful force or 
violence, that caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another; and 
2. The defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly used a dangerous weapon 
If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or lc, and 
element 2, you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of Aggravated Assault. 
If you do not find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, element la, lb or lc, 
and element 2, you must find the defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Request for Civil 
Stalking Injunction 
1 Petitioner (person needing protection): 
& 
ill 
Angelica Quintero 
First Middle Last 
Address and phone # (to keep private*, leave blapk); 
258 South 200 West #4 ] 
435-229-3791 
435-652-3124 (Work) 
Name and phone number of Petitioner's attorney (\ 
2 Respondent (person you need to be protectedtyomj. 
Mike Stevens 
First Middle /.as/ 
Odier names used: Ryder 
Address; * 
5424 ,Sw///? River Road #G-6 j 
Bloomington Hills, Utah 84790 ! 
A judge can grant a stalking injunction 0/1/y if theResnondent did th«e 3 things: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Online'Courl Assistance Program 
••
 ::'tnSl«lCf COUif! 
(pase Number. ftffi(ffiftf>bffi l | Q6. 
(pourt: Washington^&mifrtyMH WMffi 
cjounty: Washington State: tftorA 
3&cU^Ux^t^< 
feny): 
The Respondent stalked you specifically, two qr pore times. ''Stalked" means the Respondent stayed physically or 
visually close to you, made verbal or written) threats to you,'Si-rp3 something that was threatening.' 
The Respondent knew or should have lcnow^thaj the stalking Wild cause you to fear that you or a family member 
could be physically hurt or emotionally cUstij^efl, or that a reasonable person would be afraid of being physically 
hurt or emotionally distressed, and . -: 
fen immediate Jjamily member emotionally distressed or fearful that 
jar" means your, spouse, child, sibling, or any other person who 
| the past 6 ninths. 
The "Respondent's stalking actually made yoq qr: 
you would be hurt. An "immediate family mcn}b 
lives with you now, or who lived with you witlyH
101- 103, 
Provide as much information as you cap afl 
Respondent's Employer (Nome and address): 
unemployed drug dealer 
Ronnftqf for Civil Stalkinn Injunction 
Note! In addition to your own statements in this Requestt you must ptrovide some other evidence of stalking, like police 
reports, sworn statements from witnesses, aqdiottpes, photos, liters, etc. 
Fore completQpefinition of talking, see Utah Code §§ 76-5-106.5 and 77~3a-
but the Respondent. If you don't know, write "unknown.0 
1 of 5 Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2006 
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Best place and tune to find the Respondent: riaak 
Other addresses (hangouts); one & only Bar fim 
'Describe Respondent's vehicle: Make: Chevy Mcjllcl 
Year: unkno Color: blue/green with tan stripe] 
' i 
Tf more than one vehicle, describe here: Make; fold Model: JBcj 
Year: unknown Color: Red with tan stripe do\ m the bottom License Plate: i463dx 
Has the Respondent used weapons or been violent; fin ^ ie Past? Kj IYes 0 N o ^ Don l t 1cT10W 
Is the Respondent a law enforcement officer, goyercyjpent 
or licensed private investigator? 
4 Describe the stalking below; 
a. When and where did the stalldng events hbpppfi? (Attach additional pages if necessary.) 
I* stalking event: 
When: 
January 20 2009 
Where: 
Maverik 690 s river rd 
"JlWl , 1
 stalldng event: 
When: 
March 11 2009 
Where: 
on the phone 
b. Who did you report the stalldng to (if anypne)^ 
store director debbie tracy 
c. List names of all people who witnessed the stq{ 
Katrina Barney, Chrystle Weeks, Paulfi, 
d. List any evidence you have of the stalking 
from witness (affidavits), etc. You must ana 
Police Report 03/30/09 
Police Report 03/31/09 
Written statement of witness Derek ffymtti 04/01/09 
Roquost for Civil Stalking Injunction 
•tto 
Online Court Assistance Program 
home Time:\jmknown 
House Bat\ piles lodge 
: Blazer 
down the bdnorn License Plate; unknown 
:hxj)t Edition 
investigator, 
QlYos S N o • Don't know 
Iking: 
$erek Hymafy Vladimir Nominoff 
transcripts, audiotape, police reports, photos, sworn statements 
a-at-least-one* Fpf-theseto-this form. 
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(• W lit L s i > ^ .] ( ^ t , 
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isr^v 
/ 
-Wjjj & / jfyj.* <MJ ^ / ^ ^ 
1 ' I 
j ! 
i: 
*J 
^ ' ' 0 1 / i ^ rttf* 
* 
\AMJ4 $frt^ fet l,;*jU 
l I 
E'JSiSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE MB j | 
f! DAVID A GONZALEZ j 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
MyjljjoiTimissic.i esp'«eB Fet)- ^ ' - 8 ? l l ! 
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04/01/09 
12:56 
St. Geor; 
Offl 
incident Number: 09P008328 Nature 
• i 
ffil q* 
JB02213.txt| 
'police Dep|r | rs Reportj, 
: Threatening 
artment 
case #: 
Page: 
0902213 
4362 
1 
Location: 
Addr: 258 s 200 
City: St George 
w 
St: U T zip-:! 
Area: P3 
contact: Angelica 
Alert codes: 
Lst: QUINTERO 
DOB: 04/09/79 SSN: 
Rac: L S X : F Tel: (435)229-3791} 
Cty: St George St: UT zip 
Complainant: 
I 
266505 
8 
F s t : ANGELICA M id : M 
Adr: $58 S 200 W 
wrk: i?435)628-1015 
1770 |[ 
IT" 
LIFE / WlO Offense Codes: 
Circumstances: 
Respondinq Offi 
Rspnsbl officer 
Received By 
HOW Received 
when Reported 
Occurrd between 
and 
THRE THREAT AGA'INS 
STLK STALKING 
BM88 NO Bias 
WNONE No weapon tor '(Force use 
SUN u s i n g : NOT} si j fpected 
LT13 Highway/Rolacl i 
cers: Schafer, J antes: \ 2X32 chafer, Dames j Agte 
Oldroyd, icierst J u 
P IN PERSON j :1 
09:19:08 03/31/0J9 . 
12:30:00 03/28/0J9 ;! 
13:30:00 03/28/09 :" 
ncy: SGPfl 
jist RadLodi; 09:54:51 03/31/09 CMPLT 
clearance: RSP Reviewed Sgt Palmer 
Disposi t ion: INA Disp Date: 03/31/09 
Dudici aF: 
Misc 
Sts: 
Entry: 
INVOLVEMENTS: 
Date Description Relationship 
03/31/09 
03/31/09 
03/31/09 
Initial 
(UCA 
QUINJER0, ANGELICA M 
QUINTERO, ANGELICA M 
09:19:08 03/31/09 Threjatejlnng 
Contact 
63g.2-103(14)Ca)Cb)) 
Complainant 
VICTIM 
In i t ia t ing Cal l 
Responsible of f icer:D.schafer 
P.O. Number :83 ' ; "I 
Incident/Case #:69P008328/O902213 : '• 
Date/Time of Report:Tue Mar 31 09:j54;|f4 MDT 200$ 
INITIAL CONTACT: 
On 3-31-09, O f c Schafer i 
threatening complaint. Angelica Qui 
threatened her on 3-28-09 
evidence 
denied the al legat ions. T| 
joncjkd to the 
H niixbro stated! 
schafer! 
nslicase is i 
Page 1 
'lobby of the Police Station on 
jthat her ex boyfriend 
I made contact with 
pactive due to a lack of 
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e. Describe what the stalker did and why It i 
being physically harmed, and why it wou] 
being physically harmed: 
Jan 20 2O09.Parked outside my wori 
who I talked to. Made me very ui 
March 28 2009. Walking to Walgree^ 
us and spoke very clearly saying 
This made me feel like fleeing th\ 
really need help from the police 
just trying to make trouble for Mi 
seriously??? 
f. Other facts: 
1 know the reason this man wants m 
Marijuana in Central. I did not snitc 
Q Check here if you heed more space, Ask the cwkwr the "Desci 
Other Court Cases 
a. Are there other Court orders to the Respo|jJ 
(If Yes, fill out below and attach a copy qfth* 
b. Have you or the Respondent ever been i 
Q Yes E Ho (Jf yes, list ALL court cases\ 
Type of Case County and State Court 
(NOT 
report] 
Bid 
m|to 
we. 
• f-- /•».*..:i t > i „ n , : 
you or your 
/e made a mw 
hours watifk 
Wortable. Mil 
th my nepne 
ilgonnagety 
\ntry I am U 
time I've 
Vhatbitgk 
mecL I beifk 
I Mm. 
deli about stallqr 
en |/ vrd&rj 
Id in any otj 
& 
Online Court Assistance Program 
mily member feel emotionally distressed or afraid of 
pnable person feel emotionally distressed or afraid of 
w me thru the window watching what i did 
like I wasnt safe. 
\t\DereltHymas Mike Stevens pulled up behind 
if, You better watch yourself 11 will get you," 
Vred to death of my life, my parents lives & I 
fled them, theyfofflcer Bdrton)told me I was 
iff to take? me being dead before you take this 
\e\he thinks I turned him in for growing 
Stalking" form. Fill it out and attach it to this form. 
;•> Q Yes B N o 
icourt case involving either of you? 
Mr 
3 of 5 
on involved Did the judge make 
an order? 
Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2006 
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Please, Judge, I am asking y o u to: 
El Make the orders I have checked below, 
6 GEO Personal Conduct 
Order the Respondent not to stalk me. 
7 H No Contact 
Order the Respondent not to contact, pi 
indirectly, or any person listed below; 
Other people the Respondent must not 
Name 
LaNeta A. Quintero (67) 
Robert ML Quintero (65) 
JohnV. Cecil (31) 
Derek J. Hymas (23) 
! »! 
Is 
hprjqjjmail, email, <jj communicate with me in any way, either directly or 
ponti 
Relationship] 
Petitioner |j 
Mother 
Father 
Fiance 
nephew 
let; 
to 
• I ; 
8 I ] Stay Away I; fi 
Order the Respondent to stay away from: \ ] 
E a. My current or fixture: 13 Vehicle; GO 
addresses are listed below): 
Home address: 2S8 south 200 
Work address: USDA Foresi\ 
School address 
Vehicle description: 76 blue gmc\j(\ 
Online Court Assistance Program 
258 South 200 West #4 St. 
[George, UT 84770 
258 South 200 West #4 St, 
beorge UT 84770 
i684 Buena vista 
684 buena vista 
n 
)\>m 
$Mfice Forsyth 
13 b. Other (specify): 684 Buena Vuftri 
9 • Other Assistance Needed (List belay 
listed on page J of this form): 
—i t^ f»»„n e»rAiLriAr, Inlunrtflnn 
iclcup licensq. 
• • - . 
!• 
Washington 
lather orders 
! i 
Job • Schq&l E) Home, premises and property (My current 
m St. Georg 
He 
\jpeded to protect you and other protected people 
4 of 5 
Address 
bUT 84770 
Trail Road 
pB6872 
VT 84780 
Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2006 
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The Petitioner must read and sign belcpyv: 
I swear that: 11 j 
• t am the Petitioner and I have read (:his 'd 
• I am a victim of stalking and belief tte 
• I live in this countv or the Resoonduntl t I li  i  t i  ty r t  p ) 
Date: ^l/ci/Of Petitio 
Rnti 
If the Petitioner is a minor, then parent org 
I swear that: 
• I am Petitioner's parent or guardian 
• Petitioner is a victim of stalking andi I bs 
• The petitioner lives in this county on t&jblRespondent 
county. 
etition, 
Respondent 
lives in this coil 
I H 
i 
[1 have read thj$ petition, 
lieve the 
Date: Parent 
Print Parent or guardian'sjwji 
or guardian's sigmi 
i j y 
I lL 
rmitie 
Clerk or Notary Public fills out belo\jv;is: 
: j • \i 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on (a<Meh 
Clerk or Notary's Signature: L __ 
I 
i I 
pun 
Mi 
! ! 
! U 
; i :i 
I i s 
Rftciuestfof Civil Staikina Inlunclion 
signature:^ 
n must sign iklow, 
R e s i d e n t is the stalkci , and ^ 
\t& in this county, or the stalking took place in this 
SIP4 
Online Court Assistance Program 
I the stalker, and 
pty, or die stalking took place in this county. 
I 
i •*'"• u ' 
I U T K ^ L 
XIA^.VO-V> County, Utah 
i2006 
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1 emporary Civil Stalkii 
Ex Parte Order 
Petitioner (protected person): 
Online Court Assistance Program 
Angelica Quintero 
First Middle 
Address and phone # (to keep private, 
258 South 200 West M 
St George, Utah 84770 
435-229-3791 
435-652-3124 (Work) 
Last 
leave b/an/cj, 
Petitioner's attorney (If any): 
Narua 
Respondent (person Petitioner is protected from): 
fWS^iCaseNumber; nq f t f i r t f rqq ' l _ 
| ; l ^ S i l 1 1 Court: Washington County Hall of Justice 
^^^^•n .Cc iun tv : Washington State: Utah *$ ?3fiF[.Co ty:    
iE>e_«*c KQ. 
" \ 
Othe,r people protected by this ord$j> 
LaNfitaA. Quintero (67) - ^therfyfa 
Robert M. Quintero (65) - F<^rJffi$/n 
John V. Cecil (31) - fiance \^CJ * O 
Derek J. Hymas (23) - nephew ^ ^ $ r ~ * ^0,0/, 
Name 
Phone ti 
Mike Stevens 
Pint Middle 
Other names used: Ryder 
Address; 
3424 South River Road #G-6 
Bloomington Hills, Utah 84790 
Describe Respondent: 
Sex ; Race ! Bate of Birth 
Male:: | White | (Not 
I Hispanic 
h.— 
01/16/1975 
Eyes Hair 
Social Security* 
(only the last 4 numbers) 
brown brown unkown 
Distinguishing features (like scars, tattoos, limp, etc.): 
recofting hairline 
Drivers license issued by (State): 
Expires: unkown _ _ 
Findings; 
believe it 
stalker. The 
has 
The coj 
Bestltime and place to find Respondent: (TirnQ):unlcnOH>n 
(Placp): home 
The court has reviewed the Petitioner] 
jurisdiction over the parties and this c 
Respondent has the right to a hearing, if 
&.. Request far..Stalking Injunction, finds there is reason to 
|^e, that stalling has occurred, and that the Respondent is the 
he or she aslj$ for it. 
(Utah Code §77-$a-l06.S, §?7-$a-WL) 
>rders the RespotTdsnt to obey all orders initialed on this form 
You must not contact or stalk the Petitioner 
Warnings 
• Attention 
may find 
you may) 
• If you 
must be 
for a 
days, bu 
to the Respondent; 
: This is an official court order. No one ei 
you in contempt, You may also be arreted 
have committed in disobeying this order 
not agree with this order, you can ask for 
filed at the* court listed below within 10 
within 10 days, this order will last for 
t then you must persuade the court the injqfict 
do 
hearing 
This order ends 3 years 
after it is served. 
tcept the couijt can change it, If you disobey this order, the court 
and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime 
p hearing to ttjtl your side. Your request must be in writing, and 
of the date ypu were served with tliis order. If you do not ask 
3 years after it is served. You can still ask for a hearing after 10 
ion KS not nL 
ADorovad bv Board of District Court Judges, May 2006 
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Court address to ask for a hearing: Washington Co, 
84770 
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and temtoricis 
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate 
• No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you 
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this 
Vtahnpm 
Online Court Assistance Program 
ttnty Halt of justice, 220 North 200 East, Si George, Utah 
, the Districtjof Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to 
& this order, a federal judge can send you to prison. 
to have, poaaejjjs, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or 
stalking injunction is in effect, 
Against Womer^Acfl of 1991 IB U.S.C §$2265, 2262,18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) 
Obey all orders initialed by the judge. 
Violation of these orders is a criminal Class AMisdcd 
subsequent violation can result in more severe penalti 
sonal Conduct Order 
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This iriesap] 
the Petitioner. For a legal definition o; 
[pea nor, punishable b 
l 
BS. 
H you must nof follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress to 
f stalking, see Utah Code, sections 77-3a-l06.5 and 77-3a-101. 
ntact Order 
not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, ol 
listed below, either directly or indirectly 
Other people you roust not contact: 
(31), Derek J. Hymas (23) 
• communicate in any way with the Petitioner and any person 
7 ^ 
Stay^Away Order 
Stay away from: 
ED a. The Petitioner's current or fuel 
property (list current addresms 
Home address: 258 south 2m) 
Work address: USDA Forftt 
School address 
Vehicle description: 76 blue feme pickup Ijpense #2B6872 
El b. Other (specify): 684 Buena \ 
Other Orders (List below): 
Date:/ /}v)ir 0 ? T i m e : / ^ U 
Judge's Name: V L&WS ( ^'fyi 
tyuNeta A. Qtihjtero (67), Robert M. Quintero (65), John V. Cecil 
) 
i 
[ire; El Vehicfe El Job Q School El Home, premises and 
\s below): I. 
west M StAQeorge (JT 84770 
U Service Farsythe Trail Road 
\ista, Washington UT 84780 
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> 
Judge *s Signature 
Disability Accommodations and Interpreter Services 
Assistive listening systems, sign language and oral laifguagi 
proceedings. Contact the clerk's office at least 5 days 
Online Court Assistance Program 
;e interpreter services are available at no charge in stalking 
JDefore your hearing. 
I 
WASHINGTON 
his document i 
correct cop 
\ 
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